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FOURTH AMENDMENT
RESTRICTIONS ON SCIENTIFIC
MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS AT
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Roy G. Spece, Jr.t
John J. Marchalonist"
"THIS IS THE REAL WORLD, not a constitutional law
classroom," the General Counsel of our university bitterly com-
plained when one of us suggested that the United States Con-
stitution, and specifically the Fourth Amendment,' might place
limitations on searches and seizures of public university profes-
sors' offices and materials therein.2 The context was a meeting
t Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, J.D.
1972, University of Southern California Law School.
tt Professor, University of Arizona College of Medicine, Ph.D. 1967, Rocke-
feller University.
Thanks to Michael H. Shapiro, Dorothy W. Nelson Professor of Law at the
University of Southern California Law School, Professor Stuart P. Green, Louisiana
State University Law Center (visitor at James E. Rogers College of Law, University
of Arizona (2001)), and Little Rock, Arkansas attorney John Wesley Hall, Jr., for
reading an earlier draft of this article.
' The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the private university con-
text. There, certain interaction with governmental officials in the course of a scien-
tific misconduct proceeding might constitute state action and thereby bring the Fourth
Amendment into play. See, e.g., Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d
1328, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that existence of governmental action is a
question of fact and that various tests may be used to determine the existence of state
action with private parties). Moreover, there are several other sources of law that
might protect professors' offices and materials therein even in the wholly private
context. Those, too, are beyond the scope of this article. On the latter topic, see, for
example, S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee
Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 825 (1998). It is also likely that private
universities will feel pressured to offer their professors protections similar to those
afforded to public university professors.
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of the University of Arizona Research Policy Committee, which
was charged with drafting a scientific misconduct document that
would comply with federal requirements.3
Counsel's impatience is not an aberration; there is good
reason to believe that most personnel within the scientific mis-
conduct bureaucracy-lawyers included-have little sensitivity
to possible Fourth Amendment-or other constitutional4-- re-
straints on scientific misconduct processes.
The first part of the article will explore bureaucratic atti-
tudes and practices concerning the applicability of Fourth
Amendment protections to scientific misconduct searches and
seizures at public research universities, both generally and in
the specific high-profile, ongoing case of Marguerite Kay, an
eminent physician-scientist who has been accused of scientific
misconduct and barred (for a period of over two years to date)
from the University of Arizona pending a hearing on whether
3 The requirements for Public Health Service funded research are currently set
forth in 42 C.F.R. § 50, Subpart A (1999). The Federal Policy on Research Miscon-
duct that applies to all federally funded research and is designed to harmonize federal
agency substantive and procedural rules became effective December 6, 2000. See 65
Fed. Reg. 76,260 (2000) [hereinafter Federal Policy on Research Misconduct]. The
federal agencies that fund scientific research have up to one year from December 6,
2000 to implement the policy, and an "interagency research misconduct policy im-
plementation group has been established to help achieve uniformity across the Fed-
eral agencies in implementation of the research misconduct policy." Id. at 76,260.
Footuote one to the policy states: "No rights, privileges, benefits or obligations are
created or abridged by issuance of this policy alone. The creation or abridgement of
rights, privileges, benefits or obligations, if any, shall occur only upon implementa-
tion of this policy by the Federal agencies." Id. at 76,262 n. 1; see also text, infra, at
notes 11-18.
4 We hope to address other constitutional issues raised in scientific miscon-
duct proceedings in subsequent pieces. One crucial issue addressed previously, but
not analyzed completely, is the burden of proof used in scientific misconduct pro-
ceedings. The existing rules and the federal policy only provide for a preponderance
of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Elizabeth Howard, Note, Science Misconduct and
Due Process: A Case of Process Due, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 337-49 (1994) (identi-
fying due process protections that are necessary in scientific misconduct investiga-
tions). Since a finding of scientific misconduct is likely equivalent to an academic
death sentence, we favor a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. One point that needs
to be emphasized is that professors should not receive less protection than other pro-
fessionals. Indeed, given the importance of academic freedom, they should probably
receive greater protection. Yet other professionals, such as doctors and dentists, are
often protected by the clear and convincing standard that we contend is constitution-
ally mandated in administrative disciplinary proceedings and scientific misconduct
proceedings. See, e.g., Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Wyo. 2000) (ruling
the clear and convincing evidence standard is the constitutionally mandated minimum
protection required in physician disciplinary hearings).
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she is guilty of misconduct. It will also discuss the broad exist-
ing and soon to be effective definitions of "scientific miscon-
duct" and how these definitions invite abusive search and sei-
zure practices. The second part of the article will then analyze
the law concerning searches and seizures in the public work-
place generally. Finally, the third part of the article will further
analyze and apply the law explored in part two to the context of
scientific misconduct proceedings at public research universities
explored in part one (including Dr. Kay's case as an example). 5
I. BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
CONCERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
TO PUBLIC WORKPLACES
The statement above that scientifi& misconduct bureaucrats
are insensitive to Fourth Amendment concerns is evidenced by
a March 24, 2000, educational workshop conducted by the fed-
eral Office of Research Integrity 6 ("ORI") and the National
Council of University Research Administrators, entitled, Mak-
ing the Right Moves in Research Misconduct Investigations.
7
Therein it was recommended that "[a]nything that may be rele-
vant" should be seized immediately upon notification to a pro-
fessor that she has been accused of scientific misconduct, that
this should be done privately in collaboration with the accused
and in that professor's laboratory or office after business hours,
and should include materials or information, if any, contained at
5 See Eliot Marshall, Fired Researcher is Rehired and Refired, 287 Sci. 1183
(2000) (discussing aspects of litigation stemming from Dr. Kay's alleged scientific
misconduct); Eliot Marshall, The Misconduct Case That Won't Go Away, 286 Sci.
1076 (1999) (discussing the case against Dr. Kay); Tinker Ready, University of Ari-
zona Misconduct Investigation Ruled Improper, 6 NATURE MED. 120 (2000) (dis-
cussing the controversy over Dr. Kay's scientific misconduct proceeding); John
MacNeil & David Malakoff, Science Scope: In or Out?, 289 ScI. 847 (2000) (re-
viewing the processes used to terminate Dr. Kay).
6 The authority of ORI is set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. §289b (West Supp. 2000).
Currently, the ORI is primarily responsible for overseeing the scientific misconduct
bureaucracy. The ORI's role will change under the new policy referred in supra note
3. For an explanation of the complete bureaucratic apparatus prior to adoption of the
new policy, see Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga of Legal Control Over Scien-
tific Misconduct: A Clash Of Cultures Needing Resolution, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 293
(1998).
7 Video tapes on file with the Research Integrity Officer ("RIO") of the Uni-
versity of Arizona, and written materials available from the authors.
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the professor's home. Items mentioned among those that "may
be relevant" include "grant applications (all drafts)," "corre-
spondence" and "email" (including trash and network) with co-
authors and witnesses inside and outside the university, "phar-
macy records," "laboratory records," all iterations of manu-
scripts, "pertinent research materials" (including anti-sera, cells,
and biologicals), progress reports, experimental data, instrument
use logs, supply purchase records, records of laboratory sup-
port, computer files (including erased materials that can be re-
trieved), files of collaborators or co-authors, computer hard
drives, and "other related records." The possibilities for egre-
gious abuse are obvious.
One of the more thoughtful presenters, Dr. Robert Rich of
the Emory University Medical School, did note that the goal
should not be to "clean out a laboratory," but to obtain materials
that might be relevant to the allegations made as determined
upon advice of one or more persons with sufficient scientific
expertise to decide what data would be needed to substantiate
the allegations. He observed that additional material can be ob-
tained, if necessary, as the proceedings advance. However, Dr.
Alan Price, the head of ORI's investigations unit, quickly in-
terjected that it is best to obtain everything possible "up front."
He pointed out that professors often do not realize that, as to
federal grants, the federal government and university own all
research data and anything related thereto. This statement is
also clearly subject to abuse because, for example, "anything
related thereto" could sweep in proprietary information adduced
in industry-funded research similar to, but distinct from, the ac-
cused's federal government-funded research that is the subject
of an investigation. Dr. Price also pointed out that in one case
he needed to seize and copy thirteen file cabinets full of docu-
ments at a cost of $13,000. The message, again, was: make sure
you do not miss anything in the initial search and seizure.8 Dr.
Price also emphasized that ORI is ready with technical assis-
tance-such as computer expertise in searching hard drives
even for erased files-to institutional officials who wish to un-
dertake thorough searches and seizures.
8 This sentence is not intended to imply that all gatherings of materials entail
either a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These
are terms of art that apply only in given circumstances, as will be discussed below.
[Vol. 11:571
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Alarmed by the offhand advice during the workshop that
accused researchers' homes be searched, one of us asked
whether a search warrant might be needed to undertake such
intrusive investigations. C.K. Gunsalus, who was responsible
for scientific misconduct proceedings at the University of Illi-
nois, Urbana-Champaign from the mid-80's through the mid-
90's (and who now holds a different position at that university),
answered: "Absolutely not, it is university property; if you go to
the home, that might be more dicey." She also articulated crite-
ria to guide university personnel when they determine whether
to accept an allegation of scientific misconduct and to proceed
with an inquiry and any concomitant search and seizure: (1) If
the allegation were true, would there be scientific misconauct?;
(2) Have there been multiple complaints about the accused?; (3)
Are "volatile personalities" involved?; and (4) Is there a large
disparity in power between the complainant and the accused?
She further specifically cautioned that one should not consider
the complainant's motives at this point. Motives and conflicts of
interest should, according to her, only be considered during the
conduct of an inquiry or investigation.
9
The foregoing discussion, along with analysis of various
definitions of scientific misconduct and brief consideration of
how scientific misconduct proceedings are supposed to unfold,
demonstrates that there is a virtual invitation to public univer-
sity administrators to mount massive intrusions on professors'
privacy under the current system. As we argue below, a univer-
sity's global claim of ownership of anything and everything ar-
guably related to professors' professional mental lives does not
authorize such invasions.
One of the primary issues addressed in early debates over
the definition of scientific misconduct was whether such mis-
conduct should be interpreted to be criminal or tort-like in na-
ture. (Of course, it can be defined to be both criminal and tort-
like.) Many authors presented and debated notions of "deliber-
ate intent" versus "mere sloppiness" or "negligence" of varying
9 The authors must note their possible conflicts of interest. Professor Spece
has an ongoing dispute (not related to scientific misconduct) with the University of
Arizona. Professor Marchalonis is Dr. Kay's Department Head, and has consistently
agreed with departmental peer review committees that have given her outstanding
evaluations. He also has refused, along with the Dean of the College, to sign a dis-
missal letter directed to Dr. Kay.
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degrees as thresholds of culpability.10 There was and continues
to be much debate regarding the definition of scientific miscon-
duct. This is no doubt due, in part, to the varying customs and
practices among various types of researchers. For example, ba-
sic scientists who experiment primarily with materials and
chemicals, on the one hand, and clinicians who participate
mainly in large studies involving human subjects, on the other
hand, might not understand the realities of feasible or reasona-
bly expected quality control measures in their respective enter-
prises.
Nonetheless, a definition was finally promulgated and pub-
lished in what has become the main source of substantive law
for misconduct cases, Section 50, Subpart A of Volume 42 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. These regulations attempt to
both define scientific misconduct and to establish baseline pro-
cedures for reporting, investigating, and adjudicating allega-
tions. The definition of scientific misconduct appears to incor-
porate both traditional notions of dishonest data presentation
with unspecified breaches of ethical standards:
[F]abrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other prac-
tices that seriously deviate from those that are com-
monly accepted within the scientific community for
proposing, conducting, or reporting research. It does not
include honest error or honest differences in interpreta-
tions or judgments of data.11
Institutions receiving Public Health Service ("PHS") fund-
ing are required to investigate all allegations of misconduct ac-
cording to this definition. On the other hand, another major fed-
eral science agency, the National Science Foundation ("NSF'),
has a slightly different definition:
Misconduct means (1) Fabrication, falsification .... ; or
(2) Retaliation of any kind against a person who re-
ported or provided information about suspected or al-
leged misconduct and who has not acted in bad faith.' 2
10 Compare Susan M. Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific
Research, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 357 (1992) with Paul J. Friedman, Mistakes and
Fraud in Medical Records, 20 L. MED. & HEALTHCARE 17 (1992).
" 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1999).
12 Misconduct in Science and Engineering, 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(a) (2000).
[Vol. 11:571
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Note that the NSF definition does not make reference to "com-
monly accepted practices," but, rather, to those that are simply
accepted. While this difference may appear to be a trivial matter
of labeling, it could be important when trying to arrive at a
standard of behavior against which one must judge acts consti-
tuting "other serious deviations."
In fact, the "other serious deviations" clause has turned out
to be one of the most problematic aspects of the definition.13 As
noted above, the new policy, which will become effective upon
implementation by the various federal agencies, has as a major
goal the clarification and harmonization of federal agency defi-
nitions. The new policy defines research misconduct as "fabri-
cation, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or
reviewing research, or in reporting research results."'14 Thus, it
would seem to be clear what one would be looking for during a
search pursuant to a misconduct investigation: evidence of fab-
rication, falsification, or plagiarism.
However, there is at least one problem with such a straight-
forward use of the new definition to inform the scope of related
searches. Although the new definition deletes the "other devia-
tions" clause, there is still some text that indicates other factors
may be determined to establish culpability for misconduct.1
5
Specifically, after the new definition explicitly lists only fabri-
cation, falsification, or plagiarism as "misconduct," the new
policy goes on to say:
A finding of research misconduct requires that [1] There
be significant departure from accepted practices of the
relevant research community; ... [2] The misconduct be
committed intentionally, or knowingly, or recklessly;
and [3] The allegation be proven by a preponderance of
evidence.1 6
Arguably, there is a community standard that works to
broaden what might, on its face, have been considered a defini-
tion of misconduct that was tightly defined as only plagiarism
13 See Karen A. Goldman & Montgomery K. Fisher, The Constitutionality of
the "Other Serious Deviation from Accepted Practices" Clause, 37 JuIMETRIcs 149
(1997) (evaluating case law and concluding that the "other serious deviation" lan-
guage meets constitutional due process requirements).
14 Federal Policy on Research Misconduct, supra note 3, at 76, 262.
15 See id. (explaining factors required to state a claim of misconduct).
16 id.
2001]
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or some type of falsification. 17 The argument would be that the
reference to a "significant departure from accepted" in the new
policy's definition is an independent description of "scientific
misconduct" and is just as broad, or even broader, than the ref-
erences to "other practices that seriously deviate" and "other
serious deviation from accepted practices" in the existing PHS
and NSF definitions. Moreover, although neither of the already
existing federal regulatory definitions of scientific misconduct
quoted above explicitly incorporates a mental state requirement,
they can be argued to require intentional wrongdoing.' 8 The
new policy explicitly includes reckless as well as intentional
misbehavior. The comments issued with the policy explain,
moreover, that a phrase in the policy stating that "[r]esearch
misconduct does not include honest error or differences of
opinion"'19 "does not create a separate element of proof .... [;]
[i]nstitutions and agencies are not required to disprove possible
'honest error or difference of opinion."' 20
This explicit renunciation of an intent requirement could
herald a substantial expansion of target behaviors. A compari-
son of the existing and new definitions thus reveals that there
will continue to be uncertainty over what may be considered to
be scientific misconduct. The likely response of bureaucratic
officials to this uncertainty is to err in favor of a broad defini-
tion and to undertake commensurately capacious searches and
seizures. In other words, enforcement personnel are likely to
reason that the broader the feasible definition of targeted mis-
conduct becomes, the wider is the set of relevant, seizeable
material.
Turning from the definition of scientific misconduct to the
actual processing of allegations concerning them, both the ex-
isting Public Health Service regulations and the new policy
contemplate at least a three-step process. The PHS regulations
call for: (1) a preliminary assessment "to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to warrant an inquiry, whether PHS
17 Of course, the quoted language could be read to require that there be a
finding of "fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism" only if that particular conduct
deviates from "accepted practices of the relevant research community."
18 See Rebecca Dresser, Defining Scientific Misconduct: The Relevance of
Mental State, 269 JAMA 895 (1993) (exploring the concept of intent in definitions of
scientific misconduct).
19 Federal Policy on Research Misconduct, supra note 3, at 76,262.20 Id. at 76,260.
[Vol. 11:571
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support or PHS applications for funding are involved, and
whether the allegation falls under the PHS definition of scien-
tific misconduct[;]" (2) an inquiry "to make a preliminary
evaluation of the available evidence and testimony of the re-
spondent, whistleblower, and key witnesses to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence of possible scientific mis-
conduct to warrant an investigation[;]" and (3) an investigation
"to explore in detail the allegations, to examine the evidence in
depth, and to determine specifically whether misconduct has
been committed, by whom, and to what extent., 21 The new pol-
icy states:
A response to an allegation of research misconduct will
usually consist of several phases, including: (1) an in-
quiry-the assessment of whether the allegation has
substance and if an investigation is warranted; (2) an in-
vestigation-the formal development of a factual rec-
ord, and the examination of that record leading to dis-
missal of the case or to a recommendation for a finding
of research misconduct or other appropriate remedies;
[and] (3) adjudication-during which recommendations
are reviewed and appropriate corrective actions deter-
mined.22
Although, as pointed out above, Dr. Rich has recommended
that appropriate scientific expertise inform the scope of any
search and seizure, it will be shown below that this alone is not
adequate to prevent abuse. Moreover, it is not even likely to oc-
cur given the presently recommended procedures. (Nor is there
any wording in the new policy or the comments thereto that
gives reason for optimism on this point.) Specifically, the ORI
Model Policy recommends that "sequestration of research rec-
ords" occur simultaneously with the notification to an accused
that an inquiry will be conducted, while it also states that the
inquiry committee should be appointed within ten days of this
time. At this point, there is little reason to be confident that
sufficient scientific expertise will be utilized to determine pre-
cisely what data might be needed to prove the allegations. In-
21 Office of Research Integrity, Model Policy for Responding to Allegations of
Scientific Misconduct, §§ IV.E, V.A. & VII.A. (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
http://ori.dhhs.gov/htnl/nisconduct/model.asp.
2 Federal Policy on Research Misconduct, supra note 3, at 76,263.
23 See Office of Research Integrity, supra note 21, §§ V.B., V.C.
2001]
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deed, the only person required to be involved in the preliminary
assessment is the RIO. This person might not have any scien-
tific expertise whatsoever. Even if the RIO is a solid scientist,
moreover, the array of scientific questions that can arise is be-
yond the comprehension of any single individual. What is likely
to happen, therefore, is a broad sweep that will make sure
nothing could possibly be left out. As also indicated above,
moreover, according to "the experts," there is no reason to be
concerned about possible Fourth Amendment limitations, except
perhaps if the accused's home is searched.
In the current system, then, all incentives and advice point
toward swift, decisive, and complete action. Consider, again,
the criteria attorney Gunsalus proffers to judge whether to pro-
ceed. If a "lowly", but volatile laboratory assistant makes what
seems like blanket and grandiose charges against an eminent
chaired professor, who is also short-tempered, and these charges
would constitute scientific misconduct, three of the four Gun-
salus criteria would be met, and presumably an inquiry should
commence. If there had been any similar charges in the past, the
conclusion to proceed would be ineluctable. And with such
broad and serious charges, obviously the empowered adminis-
trators will need to "clean out the laboratory" and everything
else.
Indeed, a situation similar to the hypothetical in the pre-
ceding paragraph has occurred at the University of Arizona.
Specifically, on January 23, 1997, Cathleen Cover, a re-
search/laboratory assistant without even a bachelor's degree,
resigned from employment in Dr. Marguerite Kay's laboratory.
Dr. Kay was the first woman in Arizona to be awarded the
state's highest academic honor, a Regent's Professorship. One
of Ms. Cover's concerns was a reduction in her work hours and
resulting loss of compensation. Although the Kay case primarily
implicates broader issues of due process and fair procedure that
we hope to address in future publications, we use it as an exam-
ple here because it conveys a flavor of the prosecutorial zeal
that can affect both scientific misconduct proceedings, gener-
ally, and gathering of materials and data within those proceed-
ings specifically.
On February 18, 1997, Ms. Cover submitted a "to whom it
may concern" memorandum of allegations against Dr. Kay to
Charles Geoffrion, Associate Vice President for Research and
RIO at the University of Arizona. She then signed this memo-
[Vol. 11:571
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randum in his presence on March 3, 1997. Based upon this
memorandum and an interview on the same date, RIO Geof-
frion, and Ms. Alice Langen, also from the office of the Vice
President for Research, on March 6, 1997, presented allegations
against Dr. Kay to the University of Arizona Committee on
Ethics and Commitment ("UCEC"). Among the allegations was
that Dr. Kay had been responsible for unplugging a freezer (that
was vulnerable to destruction by quick changes in temperature)
in her laboratory so as to profit by subsequently filing an insur-
ance claim. This was a clearly false allegation because the
freezer contained irreplaceable research samples. These items
could not be valued and collected upon, and so Dr. Kay could
have destroyed them only at her own peril. Moreover, in no way
would Dr. Kay profit personally from any insurance money be-
cause the same would go to the funding agency, in this case the
Veteran's Administration. The Veteran's Administration would
then use the funds to purchase a new freezer and any replace-
able items damaged in the incident. Furthermore, Ms. Cover had
previously accused other persons of harassing herself and other
of Dr. Kay's employees out of their alleged hatred for Dr. Kay.
Finally, Ms. Cover had filed a claim against the university,
which later matured into a lawsuit, claiming that Risk Manage-
ment had required her to clean out the disputed freezer after the
unplugging incident even though she was not given adequate
training or protective equipment to safely complete the task.
Included in her allegations were that the freezer had contained
Polio J virus, which is, in fact, a fictitious microbe.
Other allegations were lack of authorship credit to labora-
tory workers,24 lack of standards and training regarding radio-
active and biohazardous materials, misuse of grant money to
benefit Dr. Kay's own real and personal property, horses and
dogs as well as her employees and friends, and lack of commit-
ment. The one allegation presented by RIO Geoffrion that re-
lated to scientific misconduct was that: "Respondent [Dr. Kay]
fabricated data in a study involving 19 Alzheimer patients by
using a graph originally plotted (duration of years versus time
postmortem) by Complainant [Ms. Cover] for three patients.
These data may have been the basis for a published article."
This allegation is meaningless scientifically. It makes no sense
24 It was never contended that these alleged omissions of authorship credit
amounted to plagiarism.
2001]
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to consider any analyses of "duration of years versus time
postmortem." Furthermore, the statement was made that these
data "may have been the basis for a published article." No such
data were ever published or relied on in any published article.
We submit that, given the obvious scientific absurdity of the
scientific misconduct allegation, it should have been dismissed
summarily. The most any reasonable person would have done
would have been to ask Ms. Cover to show the publication, in-
cluding the suggested figure, and to ask Dr. Kay for the same
information. Since no such information existed, the scientific
misconduct part of any proceedings would have been over with
no need for interpretation.
What actually happened, however, is that on March 13,
1997, Dr. Thomas P. Davis, Professor of Pharmacology and
Neuroscience and Chairman of the UCEC, wrote to Dr. Kay in-
forming her that the UCEC intended to review four allegations
against her, Ms. Cover's allegations about misuse of funds not
being within the committee's jurisdiction. The first was the sci-
entific misconduct charge mentioned above repeated verbatim.
The second allegation was the supposed "fabrication of periph-
eral blood data for 19 patients where only 12 patients were ever
drawn for blood samples." Two other allegations were vaguely
stated and dealt with "safety standards and staff training," and
with "commitment and effort," respectively. As will become
evident below, it is important to note that the day before Dr.
Davis' letter was authored, Ms. Cover complained to the Uni-
versity of Arizona Police Department that her car had been sto-
len and that Dr. Kay might have been involved "due to another
matter being investigated by her department and the University
of Arizona Police Department." Ms. Cover also told the police
that "she had a box of work related gaperwork in the back seat
and additional papers in the trunk." The same day the police
recovered the car and wrote a report that it was found running
and unoccupied after apparently being taken by "Hispanic male
juveniles with shaved heads."2 There is a very strong implica-
tion from these reports that the work-related documents referred
to by Ms. Cover were laboratory notebooks pertaining to her
work for Dr. Kay. There is no documentation or information,
25 Basic Report, The University of Arizona Police Department, Mar. 12, 1997,
#U97002000.
26 Police Report, Tucson Police Department, Mar. 12, 1997, #9703120487.
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however, indicating that the disputed material was ever returned
to Dr. Kay or the University of Arizona.
The UCEC reported to the Vice President for Research, Dr.
Michael Cusanovich, on April 15, 1997, with respect to the two
scientific misconduct allegations as follows: (1) "The inquiry
team was unable to find/obtain evidence required to support this
allegation," and (2) "The inquiry team was presented with no
data to support this allegation." The UCEC commented further
with respect to allegation (1) that "[t]he lack of evidence is due
to the fact that all 'raw' data books required to support this alle-
gation are missing." Based on these findings, on April 23, 1997,
Dr. Cusanovich notified Dr. Kay as follows: "I regret to inform
you that the University Committee on Ethics and Commitment
(UCEC) has found cause to believe that scientific misconduct
may have occurred in your laboratory .... I am pleased to report
that allegations of research fraud or data fabrication against you
have not been substantiated."
This communication is very curious because the UCEC had
not concluded that any further inquiry was necessary regarding
scientific misconduct. Indeed, on November 6, 2000, Dr. Sam-
uel James, a member of the UCEC panel that conducted the in-
quiry into the allegations against Dr. Kay, reported to the Uni-
versity of Arizona Faculty Senate that: (1) he had complained to
the Faculty Chair, Dr. Jerald Hogle, that scientific misconduct
charges were inappropriately pressed against Dr. Kay after she
had been exonerated by the UCEC panel; and (2) there was and
is a conflict of interest in the process because the Vice President
for Research supervises it.2
7
Giving Dr. Cusanovich the benefit of the doubt, he might
have mistakenly believed that the issues of safety, training, and
commitment referred to by UCEC fell within the "other prac-
tices that seriously deviate" part of the definition of scientific
misconduct discussed above. He also could conceivably have
27 Copies of any of the communications referred to here or above, including
unpublished opinions of the Arizona courts, can be obtained from the authors, and
any events discussed above or below based on other than written communications can
be verified by discussion with one or both of the authors. Dr. Marchalonis has knowl-
edge regarding the interacting among Dr. Kay, Dr. Cusanovich, and Ms. Cover be-
cause he was Dr. Kay's Department Head at all relevant times. As to the particular
statement in the text made by Dr. James, both authors witnessed him making it in
their capacities as faculty senators.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20011
HEALTH MATRIX
believed both that the missing notebooks were attributable to
Dr. Kay and that this justified scientific misconduct proceedings
against her. In any event, he wrote to Dr. Mary Wetzel, Chair-
man of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, on
the same day, informing her of the lack of evidence for research
fraud or data fabrication, but requesting a full investigation by
that committee. It is important to point out that, long before the
allegations by Ms. Cover against Dr. Kay, Dr. Kay and Dr.
Cusanovich had a history of mutual antagonism. Dr. Kay had
accused Dr. Cusanovich of mishandling grant monies, ignoring
complaints about harassment of her laboratory staff, and unjus-
tifiably removing space from her team, while Dr. Cusanovich
had characterized her charges against him as unethical and irre-
sponsible.
In any event, one specious scientific misconduct allegation
(fabrication of "data in a study involving 19 Alzheimer patients
by using a graph originally plotted (duration of years versus
time postmortem")) had been morphed into two (the one just
stated and "fabrication of peripheral blood data for 19 patients
where only 12 patients were ever drawn for blood samples")
that could not be substantiated. The accuser was either unwill-
ing or unable to provide documentation that supported her alle-
gations against Dr. Kay, claiming that her notebooks were
missing. This is where the above-referenced police reports be-
come relevant. Recall that they report Ms. Cover as stating that
she had work-related material in her car, which might have
given Dr. Kay an incentive to steal that vehicle. Were these the
missing notebooks? It seems highly likely that they were. Dr.
Kay had hired a private attorney to attempt to have the Univer-
sity of Arizona legal office recover missing laboratory note-
books from Ms. Cover in February 1997 after Ms. Cover left
Dr. Kay's laboratory without turning in her notebooks.2 9 Univer-
sity attorney Nick Goodman did write two letters to Ms. Cover
asking that she return the missing materials. Ms. Cover did not
return any materials.3 °
In any case, the two scientific misconduct allegations were
clearly without merit as demonstrated by inspection of pub-
lished work. The first allegation, as explained above, made no
29 See Letter from Dr. Kay's attorney, Jonathan Rothschild, to University
counsel, Nick Goodman (Feb. 11, 1997).
30 See Letters from Nick Goodman to Cathleen C. Cover (Feb. 11, 1997 &
Mar. 10, 1997).
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scientific sense whatsoever. The second allegation related to
patients "drawn for blood samples." There may have been con-
fusion because a figure in a review paper in Cellular and Mo-
lecular Biology31 refers to 19 Alzheimer's Disease (AD) pa-
tients, but the assay involved binding of a monoclonal antibody
to brain tissue, not to peripheral blood cells. No such study was
ever performed with peripheral blood involving 19 samples.
Nevertheless, on September 11, 1997, Dr. Thomas C. Cetas,
the new Chairman of CAFT, asked for, and received from the
Biomedical Communication Unit within the College of Medi-
cine, "all the slides and charts, autorads, graphs, and anything
else from 1992 through 1997, which has been submitted by Dr.
Marguerite M.B. Kay of the University of Arizona College of
Medicine, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, and
her former graduate student, Timothy L. Wyant." Biomedical
Communications is an internal entity that prepares slides,
graphs, charts, and other materials for University of Arizona
faculty members. These can be for purposes of teaching, re-
search, or outside consulting work, and faculty are charged for
the ,work according to its nature and scope. All such materials
were confiscated, without an inventory. The purpose of the sei-
zure was explained to be "an investigation by the Committee on
Academic Freedom and Tenure."
Having explored scientific misconduct proceedings gener-
ally, and the specific incident regarding Dr. Kay, we will turn to
the law on public workplace searches and seizures. After an
analysis of that body of law, we will further analyze and apply
it to the facts set forth in this first part of the article. We will
also offer additional facts about the Kay case. The Kay case is a
particularly complex one insofar as Fourth Amendment law is
concerned. We will not attempt to work out all the details here,
but will highlight the most pertinent issues and venture some
thoughts on how they might be resolved. These issues concern
third party standing and the proper role of the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements in public workplace "searches" and
"seizures." 32
31 M.M. Kay et al., Posttranslational Modifications of Brain and Erythrocyte
Band 3 During Aging and Disease, 42 CELLULAR & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 919
(1996). 32 Another issue concerns the application of the exclusionary rule in adminis-
trative proceedings, generally, and scientific misconduct cases specifically. This issue
would be analyzed similarly to the issues concerning the application of the warrant
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H. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC
WORKPLACE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Part of the lack of bureaucratic concern for Fourth
Amendment problems in scientific misconduct searches and sei-
zures could stem from the fairly weak protections that might be
suggested by a quick review of the precedents. Nevertheless,
those precedents indicate greater protections than might be
thought at first blush, and they make it indisputable that, at the
very least, professors in public research universities will usually
be held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and conse-
quent Fourth Amendment protection, as to their private offices,
desks, file cabinets, and personal materials therein.33 They will
have an even greater interest in briefcases, luggage, carrying
cases, or the like, that they might bring to the workplace.
The seminal precedent is O'Connor v. Ortega,34 a plurality
opinion authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White and Powell. Justice Scalia
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment of the Court. Jus-
tice Blackmun authored a dissent, which was joined by Justices
and probable cause requirements in the administrative and scientific misconduct
contexts. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.7, at 184-216 (3d ed. 1996). This article does not address
the exclusionary rule or other possible remedies-such as damages, attorneys' fees,
and injunctive relief-although the remedial question is a very important one in any
Fourth Amendment case. The assumption here is that universities will be deterred
from unconstitutional searches and seizures by the possibility of any relief being
entered against them involving a finding of unconstitutional action. This might be an
overly optimistic perspective, and we encourage others to address the important re-
medial questions, which themselves could fill an entire article. We similarly call on
others to analyze any or all of the issues we address here because there is a dearth of
consideration about the subject in the published literature. On remedial questions in
Fourth Amendment cases, see generally id. §§ 1.1-1.13.
33 We are not unconcerned with intrusion on other public university employ-
ees. Here we address only searches and seizures directed at faculty members. The
expectations of graduate students, adjunct lecturers, and the like depend upon a case-
by-case analysis. See People v. Powell, 599 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that graduate student did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in a
"cell" where he was assigned to work with an employee of the university; this em-
ployee and several others had keys, but the defendant did not). Nevertheless, the dis-
cussion in this article should be useful to such personnel in attempting to discern their
own rights and obligations. As to searches and seizures concerning students, see gen-
erally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.11 (3d ed. 1996); 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§§ 38.6-38.24 (3d ed. 2000).
34 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Each of these opinions and the
entire litigation preceding and following them must be closely
analyzed to understand the current state of the law and possible
future rulings. There are significant protections clearly embed-
ded in Ortega, and courts could and should grant additional
protections in the context of scientific misconduct searches and
seizures in public research universities. This is especially true
given that the plurality opinion was on very weak ground when
it limited the Fourth Amendment protections available to public
employees generally. The application of Ortega to the scientific
misconduct context will be developed in Part III of this article.
Dr. Magno Ortega, a psychiatrist, was the chief of Profes-
sional Education at Napa State Hospital for seventeen years.
According to the plurality opinion, in July 1981 officials of the
hospital, including its Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor,
became concerned about alleged improprieties of Dr. Ortega:
(1) possibly coercing residents to contribute to the purchase of a
computer for use in the residency program; (2) allegedly sexu-
ally harassing two female hospital employees; and (3) taking
inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident. On July 30,
1981, Dr. O'Connor placed Dr. Ortega on administrative leave,
and he subsequently appointed an investigative team to study
the allegations. The team decided to enter Dr. Ortega's office.
Initially, the petitioners alleged that the search was pursuant to
a hospital policy of conducting a routine inventory of state
property in the office of a fired employee. It is not the case that
one forfeits all reasonable expectations of privacy simply be-
cause she has been terminated. Once terminated, however, one
can be expected to, in a reasonable amount of time, retrieve
from the workplace any private materials and vacate a former
office or like space.
This was all moot in Ortega, however, because at the time
of the search, Dr. Ortega had not been terminated. The hospi-
tal's argument that it was acting pursuant to a policy applicable
to terminated employees was therefore clearly a pretext. Dr.
Ortega contended that the search was intended to obtain in-
criminatory evidence for dismissal proceedings against him.
The plurality described the search and seizure as follows:
The resulting search of Dr. Ortega's office was quite
thorough. The investigators entered the office a number
of times and seized several items from Dr. Ortega's
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desk and file cabinets, including a Valentine's Day card,
a photograph, and a book of poetry all sent to Dr. Or-
tega by a former resident physician. These items were
later used in a proceeding before a hearing officer of the
California State Personnel Board to impeach the credi-
bility of the former resident, who testified on Dr. Or-
tega's behalf. The investigators also seized billing
documentation of one of Dr. Ortega's private patients
under the California Medicaid program. The investiga-
tors did not otherwise separate Dr. Ortega's property
from state property because, as one investigator testi-
fied, "[t]rying to sort State from non-State, it was too
much to do, so I gave it up and boxed it up."... Thus, no
formal inventory of the property in the office was ever
made. Instead, all the papers in Dr. Ortega's office were
merely placed in boxes, and put in storage for Dr. Or-
tega to retrieve. 35
Dr. Ortega sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
various state law theories. The U.S. District Court granted
summary judgment for the petitioners on the ground that the
search was justified to secure state property, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the
search was unconstitutional and remanded the case for a deter-
mination of damages.36 The Supreme Court then granted certio-
rari.
The Court was unanimous in rejecting the petitioner's posi-
tion, supported by an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, that public employees generally have no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the workplace. The plurality also con-
cluded that the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy as
well as the appropriate standard for a search is determined, in
part, by considering whether the workplace is involved. It de-
fined the workplace as follows:
The workplace includes those areas and items that
are related to work and are generally within the em-
ployer's control. At a hospital, for example, the hall-
ways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among
other areas, are all part of the workplace. These areas
351d. at 713-14.
36 764 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 11:571
FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
remain part of the workplace context even if the em-
ployee has placed personal items in them, such as a
photograph placed in a desk or a letter posted on an em-
ployee bulletin board.
Not everything that passes through the confines of
the business address can be considered part of the work-
place context, however. An employee may bring closed
luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a
handbag or briefcase each workday. While whatever ex-
pectation of privacy the employee has in the existence
and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected
by its presence in the workplace, the employee's ex-
pectation of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not
affected in the same way. The appropriate standard for a
workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece
of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase
that happens to be within the employer's business ad-dress. 37
The plurality went on to observe, and all the other Justices
seemed to agree, that when a reasonable expectation of work-
place privacy exists, the police must obtain a warrant before
breaching that privacy. 38 The plurality, further reasoned that
supervisors and other personnel, on the other hand, might or
might not, depending on the circumstances, have a right to enter
an employee's office, desk, file cabinets, or other spaces with-
out the employee having any reasonable expectation of privacy.
This, the plurality said, must be determined case-by-case, de-
pending on factors such as customs and practices within the
particular workplace, regulations explicitly allowing and warn-
ing about random searches or entries, and the general openness
or insularity of the workplace. 39
Justice Scalia and the four dissenters reasoned that Dr. Or-
tega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. The
plurality reasoned, however, that the Court of Appeals should
have remanded for a determination on this issue. Nevertheless,
the Court was unanimous in its conclusion that Dr. Ortega had a
37 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16.
38 See id. at 718-20.
39See id. at 718.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk andfile cabinets,
reasoning:
The undisputed evidence discloses that Dr. Ortega
did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees. Dr. Ortega had occupied the office for 17
years and he kept materials in his office, which included
personal correspondence, medical files, correspondence
from private patients unconnected to the Hospital, per-
sonal financial records, teaching aids and notes, and
personal gifts and mementos.. .The files on physicians
in residency training were kept outside Dr. Ortega's of-
fice... Indeed, the only items found by the investigators
were apparently personal items because, with the ex-
ception of the items seized for use in the administrative
hearings, all the papers and effects found in the office
were simply placed in boxes and made available to Dr.
Ortega... Finally, we note that there was no evidence
that the Hospital had established any reasonable regula-
tion or policy discouraging employees such as Dr. Or-
tega from storing personal papers and effects in their
desks of file cabinets.... although the absence of such a
policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it
would not otherwise exist.
Before moving to a discussion of the plurality's approach to
defining the reasonableness of a search once it has been deter-
mined that there was a protected expectation of privacy, we
wish to reiterate and emphasize that the Court unanimously re-
jected the Solicitor General's argument for the government, as
amicus curiae, that there is never a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the public workplace. The government's view was no
doubt predicated on the notion that public employers generally
"own" buildings, offices, desks, and file cabinets. As Justice
Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, however:
This Court.. .has made it clear that privacy interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment do not turn on
ownership of particular premises. See, e.g., Rakas v. Il-
linois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("T]he protection of
the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property
590 [Vol. 11:571
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right in the invaded place but upon whether the person
who clams the protection of the Amendment has a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place");
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Fourth
Amendment protects people and not simply "areas"). 41
Turning to the plurality's discussion of the proper test to
determine whether a search is reasonable once it has been de-
termined that there is a protected expectation of privacy, it
stated that "determination of the standard of reasonableness ap-
plicable to a particular class of searches requires 'balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmen-
tal interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' 42 In the context of
public employer searches, the plurality identified the respective
interests to be weighed as the "employees' legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy" and "the government's need for su ervision,
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace."
4v
The plurality went on to state that although the reasonable-
ness rule usually requires a valid search warrant, this was not so
as to most workplace searches. However, the plurality's rea-
soning on this point is important because, as will be developed
in section III of this article, it rests upon distinctions and a bal-
ancing of interests that, when applied to the scientific miscon-
duct setting, support a conclusion that search warrants are re-
quired. The plurality's reasoning on the warrant requirement is
as follows:
While police, and even administrative enforcement
personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of
obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforce-
ment proceedings, employers most frequently need to
enter the offices and desks of their employees for le-
gitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal
conduct. Employers and supervisors are focused pri-
marily on the need to complete the government agency's
work in a prompt and efficient manner. An employer
may have need for correspondence, or a file or report
41 Id. at 740 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 719 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)) (citations
omitted).4 1 Id. at 719-20.
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available only in an employee's office while the em-
ployee is away from the office. Or, as is alleged to have
been the case here, employers may need to safeguard or
identify state property or records in an office in connec-
tion with a pending investigation into suspected em-
ployee misfeasance.
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a war-
rant whenever the employer wished to enter an em-
ployee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of
business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing
unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon super-
visors, who would otherwise have no reason to be fa-
miliar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In
contrast to other circumstances in which we have re-
quired warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the
Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the
violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related
searches are merely incident to the primary business of
the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition
of a warrant requirement would conflict with "the com-
mon-sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a con-
stitutional matter." 44
After discussing the warrant requirement, the Ortega plu-
rality then moved to a discussion whether "probable cause"
should be required even in contexts where a warrant is not. A
warrant must be based on probable cause, but it does not follow
that an exception to the warrant requirement connotes an ex-
emption from the probable cause mandate.45 The plurality went
on to reason that probable cause should not be required for ei-
ther searches for evidence of suspected work-related employee
misconduct or noninvestigatory intrusions such as those to se-
cure government property. As to the former, the plurality rea-
soned that the "delay in correcting the employee misconduct
44 Id. at 721-22 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
45 Some administrative systems provide for "administrative" rather than judi-
cial warrants, and it is theoretically possible to retain the warrant requirement without
the probable cause requirement. Nevertheless, the cases discussed in this article as-
sume that probable cause will be required whenever a warrant is required.
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caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable
damage to the agency's work, and ultimately to the public inter-
est."
4
Given that it will be established below that both the warrant
and the probable cause requirements should be retained in the
scientific misconduct context, it is important to pause here to
say a few words about the purpose and meaning of the warrant
and "probable cause" requirements. As to the warrant require-
ment, it involves obtaining a judicial order allowing a search of
specified places for particular items or persons to be seized. The
requirement is intended to protect against unjustified invasions
of privacy that would occur if governmental personnel with a
stake in successful searches and seizures were allowed to decide
for themselves when and what aggressive actions are justified.47
In other words, the warrant requirement is to prevent the inevi-
table unjustified invasions of privacy that would result from
governmental authorities' conflicts of interest in making deci-
sions about when they can visit searches and seizures upon per-
sons they wish to control for one reason or another.
Turning to "probable cause," its function is to protect the
privacy and liberty of citizens from arbitrary governmental in-
trusions. More specifically, "[i]ts function is to guarantee a sub-
stantial probability that the invasions involved in [a] search will
be justified by discovery of offending items. '48 This entails two
requirements: the items sought are subject to seizure and the
items will be found in the place to be searched. 49 In Carroll v.
United States50 the Supreme Court defined the concept as fol-
lows:
This is to say that the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
46 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 724.
47 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(a), at 395-401 (3d ed. 1996) (citing several U.S. Supreme
Court cases and also mentioning avoidance of "hurried actions" by governmental
authorities as a purpose of the warrant requirement; the "hurried actions" rationale
seems to be a makeweight at best).481 Id. § 3. 1 (b), at 7.
41 See id.
50 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automo-
bile which they stopped and searched.51
There is a plethora of cases and authorities that attempt to
fill out this definition. 52 One point that is indisputable is that the
test is an objective one, applied from the perspective of a rea-
sonable, prudent enforcement person. Another important con-
cept is somewhat disputed: what quantum of probability is nec-
essary to establish probable cause. One answer to this question
is that it is not appropriate to quantify such concepts. Another
answer is that "probable" itself connotes a more likely than not
standard. On the other hand, there are cases in some contexts
that indicate that there is not a more likely than not requirement.
Nevertheless, one of the two leading authorities on search and
seizure, Wayne R. LaFave, asserts that although there is no de-
finitive answer to the quantum of probability question, there is
good reason to adopt a more likely than not standard for at least
the question whether a wrong has been committed that might
justify an arrest or search. 3
Finally, LaFave explains that just because there is probable
cause to believe that a particular person has committed a wrong
as to which he likely has evidence, that does not give the
authorities probable cause to search every place over which the
accused has control. For example, he discusses State v. Jo-
seph,54 where the police attempted to justify a search of the de-
fendant's home because he had been caught attempting to sell
counterfeit money out of a box in his car a few hours earlier.
There were no factual data indicating that there was bogus cash
in the home, and so the court held that probable cause did not
exist. This case reflects the proper spirit of application of the
probable cause test.
The plurality next elucidated the reasonableness require-
ment that it substituted for probable cause in Dr. Ortega's cir-
cumstances, stating that a search must be justified at its incep-
tion and in its execution. As to the former: "Ordinarily, a search
of an employee's office by a supervisor will be 'justified at its
" Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392
(1985) (holding that a warrantless search of a motor home did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
52 For a discussion of these authorities, see LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 3.2.53 See id. § 3.2(e), at 70 n.196.
5 337 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1975).
[Vol. 11:571
FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a
needed file." 55 As to the execution of the search, the plurality
stated that the measures adopted must reasonably relate to the
objectives of the search and not be excessive in light of the na-
ture of the misconduct. 56 Finally, the plurality explicitly refused
to consider the appropriate standard by which to judge the sei-
zure of Dr. Ortega's personal materials found within his office,
desk, and filing cabinets because "[n]either the District Court
nor the Court of Appeals addressed this issue, and the amicus
curiae brief filed on behalf of respondent did not discuss the
legality of the seizure separate from that of the search. 57
As to the particular search and seizure before it, the Court
remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing re-
garding the purpose of the search and seizure and the reason-
ableness of both their initiation and execution in light of that
purpose.58
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion added very little. Once
again, he reasoned that employees have reasonable expectations
of privacy in their offices as a general matter. On the other
hand, he reasoned that all public employer searches will be rea-
sonable if "of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and nor-
mal in the private-employer context." 5
9
Justice Blackmun's dissent was most insightful and thus
merits extensive quotation. He captured the problems with the
plurality's opinion in the following statements:
The facts of this case are simple and straightforward.
Dr. Ortega had an expectation of privacy in his office,
desk, and file cabinets, which were the target of a search
by petitioners that can be characterized only as investi-
gatory in nature....
The problems in the plurality's opinion all arise from its
failure or unwillingness to realize that the facts here are
55 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
56 See id.
57 Id. at 729, n.*.
51 See id. at 729.
59 Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5952001]
HEALTH MATRIX
clear. The plurality, however, discovers what it feels is a
factual dispute: the plurality is not certain whether the
search was routine or investigatory. Accordingly, it
concludes that a remand is the appropriate course of ac-
tion. Despite the remand, the plurality assumes it must
announce a standard concerning the reasonableness of a
public employer's search of the workplace. Because the
plurality treats the facts as in dispute, it formulates this
standard at a distance from the situation presented by
this case.
This does not seem to me to be the way to undertake
Fourth Amendment analysis, especially in an area with
which the Court is relatively unfamiliar. Because this
analysis, when conducted properly, is always fact spe-
cific to an extent, it is inappropriate that the plurality's
formulation of a standard does not arise from a sus-
tained consideration of a particular factual situation.
Moreover, given that any standard ultimately rests on
judgements about factual situations, it is apparent that
the plurality has assumed the existence of hypothetical
facts from which its standard follows. These "assumed"
facts are weighted in favor of the public employer, and,
as a result, the standard that emerges makes reasonable
almost any workplace search by a public employer....
At the onset of its analysis, the plurality observes that
an appropriate standard of reasonableness to be applied
to a public employer's search of the employee's work-
place is arrived at from "balancing" the privacy interests
of the employee against the public employer's interests
justifying the intrusion .... Under traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, however, courts abandon the
warrant and probable-cause requirements, which con-
stitute the standard of reasonableness for a government
search that the Framers established, "[o]nly in those ex-
ceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable...."
A careful balancing with respect to the warrant require-
ment is absent from the plurality's opinion, an absence
[Vol. 11:571
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that is inevitable in light of the gulf between the plural-
ity's analysis and any concrete factual setting. It is cer-
tainly correct that a public employer cannot be expected
to obtain a warrant for every routine entry into an em-
ployee's workplace. This situation, however, should not
justify dispensing with a warrant in all searches by the
employer. The warrant requirement is perfectly suited
for many work-related searches, including the instant
one.6
The dissent also pointed out that the plurality opinion ig-
nored that, especially with so many women entering the work
force, it "is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace has
become another home for most working Americans." As a con-
sequence, "the tidy distinctions (to which the plurality al-
ludes...) between the workplace and professional affairs, on the
one hand, and personal possessions and private activities, on the
other, do not exist in reality."
61
Even if it were concluded that neither the warrant nor the
probable cause requirement applies to public research university
scientific misconduct searches and seizures, there would still be
significant restraints even based on a direct and sole application
of the limitations actually applied to the conduct at issue in Or-
tega. Indeed, Dr. Ortega ultimately won a jury verdict for
$436,000 based on the illegal search and seizure inflicted upon
him. The course of Dr. Ortega's litigation following the Su-
preme Court's opinion gives an insight into how far out of line
bureaucracies can go, and how important is the need for Fourth
Amendment protections.
Upon remand, Dr. Ortega represented himself at a jury trial
in 1992. The judge granted a directed verdict for all the defen-
dants at the close of the evidence. The Court of Appeals re-
versed because the trial judge had improperly excluded most of
Dr. Ortega's witnesses for failing to serve a witness list on op-
posing counsel. 62 Upon the second remand, the defendants re-
treated from their general assertion before the Supreme Court
that they invaded Dr. Ortega's office because of their need to
secure state property. They contended, instead, that they were
60 Id. at 732-34, 741,745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id at 739-40 n.6.
62 See Ortega v. O'Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing
prior procedural history of case).
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investigating improper management of the Department of Pro-
fessional Education and alleged sexual harassment. Dr. Ortega
continued to argue that defendants were just on a fishing expe-
dition to find evidence to justify dismissal without any specific
allegation of wrongdoing or expectation of finding any particu-
lar evidence, and that the scope and length of the search and
seizure were unreasonable. 6
3
This time a new trial judge ruled, during a pre-trial hearing,
that the evidence of alleged "sexual harassment" could not have
reasonably supported the search or any part of it, and that the
seizure of certain materials (the "Sutton materials" referred to
below) violated Dr. Ortega's rights as a matter of law. 64
Stripped of the sexual harassment pretext at trial, the hospital
went back to the excuse that the search was simply part of an
established procedure to inventory property within offices of
departing, terminated, or separated employees. The Court of
Appeals elaborated upon the nature and scope of the search and
seizure:
The search was extremely thorough and highly intru-
sive. The investigative team entered Dr. Ortega's office
on several occasions and repeatedly searched his office,
his desk, and his private file cabinets. In his desk draw-
ers, the investigators examined and, according to Dr.
Laskay's report, read "numerous personal letters from
friends, one of his ex-wives, a daughter, as well as many
sexually explicit letters from several women over the
years." The investigators removed the checks and corre-
spondence regarding Dr. Ortega's acquisition of the
computer. They then reviewed and boxed up the re-
maining state property along with Dr. Ortega's personal
possessions-lecture notes and numerous teaching aids,
framed artwork, photographs from students, letters from
family members, copies of published and unpublished
articles, rejection letters from medical journals, a manu-
script for a new book, desk accessories, and confidential
medical files of patients not connected with the Hospi-
tal-and placed everything in a special locked storage
area to which Dr. Ortega did not have access. At no time
did anyone ever inventory any of the state's items from
63 See id.
64 See id. at 1154 (describing the trial court's holding).
[Vol. 11:571
FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
the office; nor did anyone ever separate the state's prop-
erty from Dr. Ortega's personal property. Everything
was simply boxed up and kept together in the state's
possession for a lengthy period.
During the course of the search, Friday conducted an
exploration of his own one evening, without the other
investigators. He found and removed from Dr. Ortega's
desk drawer a suggestive photo, a Valentine, and a book
of love poetry (with a short inscription) given to Dr.
Ortega about ten years earlier by a former resident, Dr.
Joyce Sutton. Friday recognized Dr. Sutton as a medical
school classmate of Dr. O'Connor's. Friday took these
items, which became known as the "Sutton materials,"
and promptly showed them to Dr. O'Connor. No one
had then, or has ever since, alleged that Dr. Ortega
sexually harassed, or behaved improperly toward Dr.
Sutton. The only "official" use to which these seized
materials were ever put was to attempt to impeach Dr.
Sutton when she testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf at a
State Personnel Board hearing. 6
5
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' contentions
that they were protected by qualified immunity and that the trial
court had erred by deciding the search could not have been jus-
tified by any concern over sexual harassment. As to the quali-
fied immunity, it found that no reasonable official at the perti-
nent time could have found the search and seizure to be proper
under facts reasonably found by the jury:
(1) that the defendants, under the pretense of conducting
an "inventory" of state property in order to separate per-
sonal from official materials, conducted instead a purely
indiscriminate fishing expedition through his most per-
sonal belongings in hopes of discovering some evidence
that might be useful at an adversary administrative
hearing;
(2) that the repeated intrusions and examinations of Dr.
Ortega's private possessions, including his purely per-
651Id. at 1152.
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sonal belongings, clearly exceeded the scope of a rea-
sonable work-related search;
(3) that the defendants retained all of the property that
had been in his office, both personal and official, in one
undivided mass; and
(4) that when their first explanation was exposed as
false, the defendants then offered other equally untruth-
ful rationales for their conduct. 66
As to the issue of sexual harassment, the court reasoned:
First, two complaints of improper conduct by Dr. Ortega
over a seventeen-year period did not warrant a reason-
able suspicion that the doctor was sexually harassing
residents. The stronger of the two complaints was ten
years old, rendering that evidence "stale" by any stan-
dard. It was also wholly uncorroborated. The more cur-
rent complaint-the one that alleged specifically only
that Dr. Ortega had appeared at an unidentified resi-
dent's home on a Saturday morning-was far too vague
and unsubstantiated to serve as a basis for reasonable
suspicion warranting any search of an employee's pri-
vate office, let alone so intrusive a search and seizure of
his most personal possessions. "Reasonableness" must
be viewed in the context of the nature of the intrusion
involved.
We need not rest our decision solely on this ground,
however, for even if the evidence were sufficient to
warrant reasonable suspicion necessary for such a
search, the defendants had no grounds to suspect that
any evidence of sexual harassment would be found in
Dr. Ortega's office. Indeed, Dr. O'Connor testified ex-
pressly that he had no reason to suspect that any such
"specific" evidence might be found there, and that he
did not tell the investigators to look for anything in par-
ticular. Moreover, neither of the alleged incidents in-
volved the sending of any letters by (or even to) Dr.
6Id. at 1159.
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Ortega or in any way involved any type of physical evi-
dence that might be found amongst his private posses-
sions. The search was, at best, a general and unbounded
pursuit of anything that might tend to indicate any sort
of malfeasance-a search that is almost by definition,
unreasonable. See Stanford [v. Texas (1986)] 379 U.S.
[476] at 486, (holding that the "history" and the
"meaning" of the Fourth Amendment mandate that a
warrant allowing an "indiscriminate sweep" by the gov-
ernment through a person's "books, records.... pictures,
recordings, and other written instruments... is constitu-
tionally intolerable") (internal quotation omitted).67
The court further observed:
We note that we seriously doubt that the seizure of the
Sutton materials would be reasonable in any event. The
materials consisted of a picture, a valentine, and a book
of poetry given to Dr. Ortega by a former resident. The
receipt of such gifts by him would not appear to consti-
tute evidence that he engaged in any act of sexual har-
assment.
68
The court finally summarized the standard to be used in
judging the reasonableness of investigatory searches:
[A]ny search of private areas for evidence of such ac-
tivities must at a minimum be based on a specific reason
to suspect that particular evidence exists and that it will
be found in the place to be searched; moreover, such a
search must be carefully limited in scope, not only be-
cause of an historic respect for fundamental privacy but
because of the need to insure that the search will not be
"excessively intrusive." O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726
(plurality opinion).... The rule we apply in this case is
not, contrary to the defendants' assertion, a probable
cause rule; it simply reflects a proper definition of what
constitutes an unreasonable intrusion under all the cir-
cumstances. 
69
67 Id. at 1162-63 (citation omitted).
68Id. at 1162 n.18.
69 Id. at 1163-64.
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It should be helpful, at this point, to summarize the guid-
ance offered by the authorities involving searches and seizures
in the public workplace. After that brief summary, the article
will, in the next section, apply the general body of public work-
place law to scientific misconduct proceedings involving public
research university professors.
The following propositions are contained in the foregoing
analysis:
(1) The Fourth Amendment protects people and their rea-
sonable expectations of privacy, not simply places or
property interests therein;
(2) The warrant requirement is intended to prevent unjusti-
fied invasions of privacy that would otherwise flow
from governmental officials' conflicts of interest in de-
termining for themselves when they should be allowed
to direct searches and seizures against persons they
seek to control in one way or another;
(3) The probable cause requirement is intended to protect
liberty and privacy by demanding a substantial prob-
ability that the items sought are subject to seizure and
that they are located in the place to be searched;
(4) On most issues, Ortega is merely a plurality opinion,
and it therefore does not have binding authority. The
plurality opinion is poorly reasoned, leading, as the dis-
sent pointed out, to too ready exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements. As such, the plurality
opinion should be read to establish a baseline of mini-
mal protection that should be recognized in the public
workplace setting generally. At the same time, the plu-
rality opinion should not be construed to prevent sub-
stantial protections beyond this minimal baseline;
(5) Five members of the Supreme Court agreed in Ortega
that public employees generally have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their offices, desks, file cabinets,
like spaces, and personal materials therein;
(6) All members of the Supreme Court agreed that Dr. Or-
tega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk, file cabinets, and personal materials therein, and
the plurality opinion indicated that this reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy flowed in part from the fact that
"the Hospital had [not] established any reasonable
[Vol. 11:571
FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
regulation or policy discouraging employees such as
Dr. Ortega from storing personal papers and effects in
their desks or file cabinets;
70
(7) Even the Ortega plurality implied, by language indi-
cating that there is a greater expectation of privacy in
briefcases, luggage, or carrying cases brought to the
workplace than there is in, say, desks or filing cabinets
within the workplace, that public employees will gener-
ally have sufficiently enhanced expectations of privacy
to require warrants and probable cause when the gov-
ernment seeks to search or seize items such as, or
within, briefcases, luggage, or carrying cases brought to
the workplace, and the four dissenters would probably
agree with this given their clear intent to extend greater
protections in the public workplace;
(8) All members of the Supreme Court seemed to agree in
Ortega that the warrant and probable cause require-
ments will apply to police searches and seizures di-
rected at public employees;
(9) The Ortega plurality reasoned that neither the warrant
nor the probable cause requirement should generally
apply to the public workplace setting because employ-
ees' expectations of privacy are usually outweighed by
the interference with efficiency and the impracticability
that would be caused by those requirements, but this
reasoning has been forcefully and persuasively attacked
by the dissenting opinion as well as by commentators
who have analyzed public workplace searches and sei-
zures;
(10)The Ortega plurality also entertained the possibility
that, in some public workplace scenarios, the balancing
process it adopts might dictate that the probable cause
requirement be retained even if the warrant requirement
is found unnecessary; -
70 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987). The dissenting opinion also
observed that some courts had held that reasonable expectations of privacy are ne-
gated by the existence of regulations purporting to give the public employer the right
to conduct searches. See id. at 738 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is unlikely that
public universities would attempt to adopt and sufficiently publicize, or that their
professors would tolerate, regulations explicitly denying Fourth Amendment protec-
tions. To the contrary, their policies and procedures usually refer to maximum pro-
tection of academic freedom.
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(11) Even if the case-by-case balancing called for by the
Ortega minority is accepted as appropriate and it is de-
termined under that test that the warrant and probable
cause requirements do not apply, governmental person-
nel must still show that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that scientific misconduct has occurred and that
there are items subject to seizure in the particular areas
of the workplace they intend to search;
(12)Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit found that there was
no reasonable cause to believe either that Dr. Ortega
was guilty of any wrongdoing or that any evidence of
any wrongdoing would be found in his private office,
and it also reasoned that the search "was, at best, a gen-
eral and unbounded pursuit of anything that might tend
to indicate any sort of malfeasance-a search that is
almost by definition, unreasonable;" 71
(13) Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit also noted that the sei-
zure of Dr. Ortega's personal materials would have
been improper even if there had been reasonable cause
to believe that he committed sexual harassment and that
there was evidence of the same in his office, desk, or
file cabinets; and
(14)Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit pointed out, quoting
from the Supreme Court's plurality opinion, that a
search must be "carefully limited in scope" and not
"excessively intrusive."
The foregoing propositions will now be applied and ana-
lyzed further in the scientific misconduct setting.
71 Ortega, 146 F.3d at 1163. As indicated above, the court also stated that "we
seriously doubt that the seizure of the Sutton materials would be reasonable in any
event." Id. at 1162 n.18.
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M. APPLICATION OF PUBLIC WORKPLACE
AUTHORITIES TO SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PUBLIC RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (INCLUDING THE
CASE OF DR. KAY)
The first issue we will address in this section of the article
is when the warrant and probable cause requirements will apply.
As pointed out above, even the plurality opinion in Ortega indi-
cates that the warrant and probable cause requirements will ap-
ply to closed luggage, briefcases, carrying cases, and other per-
sonal property a public employee takes to the workplace. Even
more clearly, moreover, a warrant and probable cause will be
required whenever the employer proposes to search an em-
ployee's home.72 It might be argued that the employer can
merely request that the employee consent to a search of his
home, with the understanding that he will be considered an un-
cooperative employee subject to discipline if he does not coop-
erate. Any such argument must be rejected. A consent must be
voluntary, and no negative consequences can be attached to the
refusal of consent.73 There are many factors that might influence
the finding of voluntariness, 74 but one factor most likely to pro-
duce a finding of involuntariness is an express or implied claim
that the employer can proceed to make the search in any event.75
An issue that is likely to arise, given the importance of
computers in current research endeavors and the ORI's obvious
72 See Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that a dormi-
tory is a "home" and that a search of the dormitory requires probable cause and a
warrant or consent); Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding administrative warrant not sufficient to search police offi-
cer's garage and automobiles therein, and officer could not properly be charged with
insubordination for refusing to honor the administrative warrant). "Nowhere is the
protective force of the fourth amendment more powerful than it is when the sanctity
of the home is involved." Id. at 884.
73 The seminal precedent regarding voluntariness is Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that consent must be voluntary, not coerced
by explicit or implicit means, threat, or force). As to the impropriety of threatening or
implementing negative consequences, see Jackson v. Gates, 975 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding it improper for the city to fire police officer for exercising his Fourth
Amendment right to refuse to submit to an unconstitutional search).
74 For discussion of this issue, see 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 8.1 & 8.2 (3d ed. 1996).75 See generally Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (hold-
ing that a prosecutor's burden of proving consent to a search cannot be met simply by
showing acquiescence to a claim of authority).
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concern with computer-based information, is a desire to search
personal lap top computers that professors might carry to and
from the office. Such computers, like desks and file cabinets,
likely contain personal as well as work-related material. How-
ever, the same is true as to briefcases, and even the Ortega plu-
rality implied that the latter are subject to the warrant and prob-
able cause protections. It presumably gave them more protec-
tion because they are usually owned by the employee, less apt
to contain as many work-related materials, and more likely to
contain personal materials. The same would likely be true to as
to laptop computers. Even if they are on loan from the public
employer, once they are taken home, they are more likely to
contain greater amounts of personal items and less amounts of
work-related items. They should be given commensurately
greater protections than property permanently at the work place.
Indeed, they might merit more protection than a personal desk
taken to the workplace for indefinite use in the ordinary course
of business. This is because the desk is likely to contain more
work-related materials by its very presence at the work place.
76
It would seem permissible for the employer to request
prompt production of a copy of files from such a laptop com-
puter if the files are reasonably related to a specific claim of
scientific misconduct in federally or locally funded research.
However, a command that a professor sit down at any given
moment and immediately peruse the personal computer's files,
especially with another employee looking over his shoulder,
would constitute a search, and it should therefore have to be
preceded by a warrant and probable cause.77
76 Cf. Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating
"[b]ut we fail to find an expectation of privacy in the cabinets simply because Goss-
meyer bought them herself. The cabinets were not personal containers which just
happened to be in the workplace; they were containers purchased by Gossmeyer pri-
marily for the storage of work-related materials").
77 For example, in Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp. 2d. 58 (D.N.H.
1997), discussed in the text infra accompanying notes 86-93, the court held that
posting a police officer inside a public official's house to ensure that she would not
remove the town's financial records constituted an unreasonable search because it
was not preceded by a warrant. Although there would not necessarily be a police
officer involved in the situation posited in the text, the scientific misconduct en-
forcement personnel are similar to police in that they are seeking to uncover specific
wrongdoing by invoking their authority and reason for being. Moreover, the fact that
the laptop is in the indefinite or permanent possession of the researcher calls for
greater protection that was allowed in Rossi because, in Rossi, there was no invasion
into such "personal" property. On the other hand, the Rossi court held that although
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Moving to areas said by the Ortega plurality to be subject
to searches and seizures without warrants and probable cause
findings, it might be thought that the opinion should be con-
strued to extend to searches and seizures of professors' offices,
desks, file cabinets, similar spaces, and materials therein.78 The
are several considerations, however, that indicate that the war-
rant and probable cause requirements should extend to scientific
misconduct searches and seizures of professors' private materi-
als and matters. To begin, even the Ortega plurality indicates
that the warrant and probable cause requirements are more fea-
sible when there is an administrative enforcement action by ad-
ministrative enforcement personnel as opposed to when "ordi-
nary" public employers or supervisors are conducting a search
in connection with suspected workplace misconduct or with a
need to locate certain materials necessary to the ongoing opera-
tion of the particular public entity.79 It also appears that the four
dissenters would have even applied the warrant and probable
cause requirements in Dr. Ortega's circumstances. Scientific
misconduct proceedings are administrative enforcement pro-
ceedings required by federal law and subject to appeal through
the federal bureaucracy. 80 They are carried out by institutional
officials (e.g., RIOs), and these officials must adhere to detailed
regulations. The institution itself is subject to further enforce-
ment action against it if it fails to carry out its enforcement ob-
ligations.81 The Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI) retains the
authority to conduct investigations itself, and it will do so if the
there were seizures of both Rossi's person and of "property" in which she had an
interest, these seizures were reasonable even though not preceded by a warrant. Once
again, however, the indefinite personal possession of the laptop might distinguish the
researcher's situation and lead to a finding of an unreasonable seizure as well as an
unreasonable search. Cf. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946 (2001)
(holding that police officer's refusal to allow defendant to enter his residence without
a police escort until a search warrant could be obtained was a "reasonable seizure").
78 Hereafter we will refer to professors' offices, desks, file cabinets, similar
spaces, and materials therein as "private materials and matters."79 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,721-22 (1987).
80 See 42 C.F.R. § 50, Subpart A (1999) (outlining the responsibilities of those
who receive assistance under the Public Health Service Act to report scientific mis-
conduct; see also Opportunity for a Hearing on Office of Research Integrity Scien-
tific Misconduct Findings, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,125 (1992); Hearing Procedures for Sci-
entific Misconduct, 59 Fed. Reg. 29,809 (1994).
8! See 42 C.F.R. § 50, Subpart A, and specifically § 50.103(a) (1999) (dis-
cussing the establishment and use of an administrative process at institutions receiv-
ing PHS funds to monitor scientific misconduct).
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institution is unwilling or incapable of doing the job.82 Moreo-
ver, OSI can decide to impose sanctions on the convicted re-
searcher in addition to those the institution may decide to ap-
ply.83 The foregoing facts establish that scientific misconduct
proceedings are administrative enforcement actions in which the
warrant and probable cause requirements are quite apt.
This becomes evident upon consideration of the reasoning
behind the Ortega plurality's distinction between administrative
enforcement personnel, on the one hand, and "ordinary" public
employers or supervisors, on the other hand. The plurality rea-
soned that: (1) employers, as opposed to enforcement personnel,
are not versed in legal requirements such as warrants and prob-
able cause; and (2) employers become involved in disciplinary
proceedings collateral to their primary functions, while en-
forcement personnel, which the plurality mentioned in the same
breath along with police, are in the business of enforcing rules
and regulations. These underlying rationales indicate that per-
sonnel involved in scientific misconduct proceedings are ad-
ministrative enforcement personnel who need to be, and feasi-
bly can be, bridled by the warrant and probable cause require-
ments.
The institution will have at least one person, usually desig-
nated as the RIO, who will be responsible for assuring that the
detailed federal regulations are enforced according to the sub-
stantive and procedural guidelines set forth therein. These per-
sons will not be able to function without becoming familiar with
legal requirements and the need to seek university counsel's
advice when in doubt as to those mandates. Moreover, enforce-
ment work is not collateral to these administrators' functioning,
but, rather, is the very reason for their being. The latter state-
ment suggests an additional reason to treat enforcement person-
nel like police. They are in the business of enforcing rules, and
they are judged by evidence that they have successfully re-
sponded to misconduct. This can lead to over-zealous enforce-
ment that needs to be restrained by the warrant and probable
cause requirements.
The plurality also spoke of the need for quick discipline,
and this implies that it considered routine, quickly resolvable
82 See id. §§ 50.104(a)(5) & (6) (describing the situations in which the OSI
may choose to undertake its own investigation of possible scientific misconduct).
83 See id. § 50.104(a)(7).
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disciplinary matters as not being important enough to justify
substantial procedures. However, at least certain administrative
enforcement matters are grave enough to justify full warrant and
probable cause protections. Of course, scientific misconduct
proceedings are especially grave administrative enforcement
actions. Conviction of scientific misconduct is tantamount to an
academic death sentence. It is often considered worse than cer-
tain felonies. Consider, for example, an article on the topic
whose title captures the idea that scientific misconduct is
equivalent to crime: Scientific Misconduct: A Form of White
Coat Crime.84
It is helpful to consider more closely the Ortega plurality's
statement that most public employers, including hospital per-
sonnel, have no reason to be familiar with warrant and probable
cause requirements.85 Even if the administrative officials or
RIO's responsible for enforcing the federal regulations are not
familiar with warrant and probable cause requirements, univer-
sities large enough to employ faculty who obtain federal grants
invariably have legal staffs who might not be, but certainly
should be, familiar with those mandates. Therefore, the warrant
and probable cause requirements fit the context of scientific
misconduct in public research universities even if they are as-
sumed, arguendo, to be inappropriate in most workplace set-
tings.
Furthermore, the language in the Ortega plurality that cre-
ates a special exemption from the warrant and probable cause
requirements in the general public workplace setting is found in
the context of the broader requirement that there be a balancing
of interests. All public employees are entitled to respect of their
privacy. In the public university setting, however, there is an
additional interest in academic freedom. Academic freedom
must be given considerable weight in any balancing process be-
cause it is an institution recognized to protect the public interest
84 Sandy Kline, Scientific Misconduct: A Form of White Coat Crime, J.
PHARMACY & L. 15 (1993).
85 The plurality's point is not very strong, at least concerning hospitals. Hos-
pitals usually have access to attorneys to advise them on multiple matters. Neverthe-
less, large research universities certainly have greater access to attorneys than do
most hospitals. Indeed, many research universities include hospitals within their
structure. The plurality also fails to explain how employers will be able to understand
the alternative, reasonable cause requirement.
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by assuring "the ardor and fearlessness of scholars." 86 It is deni-
grated if enforcement personnel can conduct intrusive searches
without a search warrant. It is also true that public university
professors have a heightened expectation of privacy. This is
consistent with the autonomy essential to their creativity and
position as unique spokespersons for the public interest and
truth. This additional value should tip the scales in favor of pro-
fessors' rights to privacy.
It might be argued that Dr. Ortega himself was a professor,
and so one cannot suppose that the plurality's reasoning can be
found inapplicable to the scientific misconduct setting. How-
ever, there is no indication that Dr. Ortega was working in a
public research university setting with the expectations and
protections related thereto. Indeed, there is much indication that
he was little more than a civil service employee subject to dis-
missal on fairly thin grounds after relatively lax procedural
protections.
Specifically, although Dr. Ortega litigated for years over
the search and seizure he was subjected to, there is not one
word of any attempt by him to overturn a finding by a civil
service personnel board that he was subject to dismissal. This
indicates that he was little more than an "at will" employee be-
cause the only charges suggested against him were found, in the
opinions discussed above, to be without enough merit to even
justify the initiation of the search and seizure he was subjected
to, let alone support a dismissal for reasons that would be nec-
essary to dismiss a tenured faculty member at a public research
university. Recall, moreover, that Dr. Ortega had been in his
position for seventeen years. Public research universities in-
variably have "up and out rules" pursuant to which a professor
must be promoted to tenured status or dismissed long before
seventeen years.
Remember also that the Ortega plurality reasoned that there
was a need for quick discipline that would be interfered with by
requiring formal legal trappings in employee disciplinary pro-
ceedings. This value is simply not at stake in the public univer-
86 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (speaking of the need to protect the "ardor and fearlessness of scholars"); see
also, e.g., Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreword, Academic Freedom in
a Changing Society, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1247 (1988) (supporting the notion that schol-
ars/acadernics must be free to pursue research interests without fear of reprimand);
THE CONCEPT OF AcADEMIc FREEDOM (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975).
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sity setting when a tenured or tenure-track professor is accused
of scientific misconduct. In that context, there will be prolonged
internal proceedings before appropriate committees with a right
of at least some review in the courts. Interference with swift
discipline is not a value because quick discipline is deliberately
considered inappropriate.
Thus far it has been argued that: (1) the Ortega plurality's
implications that the warrant and probable cause requirements
apply to administrative enforcement actions and to closed lug-
gage, briefcases, carrying cases, and other personal property
employees take to work imply broad protection in scientific
misconduct proceedings; (2) the very balancing test that the
Ortega plurality found to justify exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements in the setting there leads to an op-
posite conclusion in scientific misconduct proceedings at public
research universities; (3) the alleged impracticability and ineffi-
ciency of imposing warrant and probable cause requirements in
hospitals and most public employment settings does not exist at
public research institutions where legal expertise is readily
available; and (4) the warrant and probable cause requirements
obviously apply to searches and seizures in researchers' homes.
The Ortega plurality opinion actually provides substantial pro-
tection to researchers, and, to the extent it suggests limitations
upon additional protections, it is distinguishable. It should also
be added that, to the extent the Ortega plurality opinion is con-
strued to bar any particular protections, it should be rejected as
non-binding and inferior to the more protective approach em-
braced by the Ortega dissenters and the commentators gener-
ally.87
Let us fill out the Ortega dissenters' criticism that the plu-
rality did not anchor its reasoning in any concrete facts neces-
87 See Heather L. Hanson, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace:
Are We Really Being Reasonable? 79 VA. L. REV. 243 (1993) (evaluating the Su-
preme Court's approach to Fourth Amendment analysis in the employment context);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public,
1989 SuP. CT. REv. 87(discussing various courts' efforts to limit rights by expanding
searches and seizures); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 119, 230-40 (1987) (reviewing constitutionality of search and seizure di-
rected at public employees). But see William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Govern-
ment Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992) (stating that if
government could not search private spaces, it would strip employees of all such
spaces; therefore employees benefit by a rule giving public employers wide latitude
in workplace searches).
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sary to craft a realistic opinion. The plurality made a large mis-
take by equating, in its balancing, the contexts of investigatory
and non-investigatory searches. The former are hostile and tar-
get the employee himself. They are likely to entail a search for
unspecified, personal items that might be used to advantage in a
prosecution. Such prosecutions can involve substantial expense,
stigma, and deprivation of privacy for the researcher. They are
likely to be rare, and requiring a warrant or probable cause in
these few instances is unlikely to disrupt the employer's func-
tioning.
Noninvestigatory searches, on the other hand, are, by defi-
nition, aimed solely at specific employer property and are un-
likely to require examination of personal items the employee
has attempted to separate in the workplace. They are also more
frequent. In this latter context, therefore, warrants and the prob-
able cause requirement are arguably both more disruptive and
less necessary. 88 This context might be analogized to the ad-
ministrative inspection-such as housing searches-in which
the courts have developed various exceptions and qualifications
to the warrant and probable cause requirements.8 Of course,
scientific misconduct searches are investigatory, rather than
non-investigatory, searches. They therefore merit full protec-
tions.
The Ortega dissent also correctly points out that, in the
modem work world, and with both parents often holding jobs,
the distinction between home and office has evaporated. Many
personal items are inevitably brought to work. This is especially
true in the scientific misconduct setting because professors not
only often live at the office, but also frequently work at home.
And professors do not just bring personal items to the work-
place and their offices. They might even keep there files relat-
ing to counseling of students, consulting work, or intellectual
endeavors performed on their own time. Their privacy and
property rights, as well as those of third parties, are likely to be
88 See The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 88, at 236-
37 (stating that routine searches for government files do not focus on the employee
personally and therefore pose a lesser threat to privacy interests).
89 See LAFAvE, supra note 33, §§ 10.1-10.11; HALL, supra note 33, §§ 34.1-
34.38.
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invaded by searches and seizures directed at their offices and
the contents thereof.
Another strong indication that both the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements should be held to apply to at least most
scientific misconduct searches and seizures at public research
universities is found in Rossi v. Town of Pelham.90 There, the
plaintiff town clerk and tax collector was ousted in an election.
Pending the transition, she intended to perform an audit re-
quired by state law by taking financial records to her home.
Certain town officials learned of this plan, and to prevent it they
ordered her not to take the records and posted a police officer
inside her office. She sued the officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and various state law theories, claiming that the police officer's
presence in her office constituted an unreasonable search of her
office, an unreasonable seizure of her person, and an unreason-
able seizure of her property. The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment.91
The court first held that it was irrelevant that the purpose of
the police officer's presence was to prevent removal of records
as opposed to discovering evidence. There was a "search" in
any event. The court next held that plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her office. It observed that four fac-
tors-(1) whether the work area is given over to the employee's
exclusive use; (2) the extent to which others have access to the
workspace; (3) the nature of the employment; and (4) whether
office regulations placed the employee on notice that the dis-
puted area was subject to occasional intrusions-had been de-
veloped to guide the case-by-case determination called for by
the Ortega plurality on this issue. 92 Each of the factors sup-
ported a reasonable expectation of privacy here.
The court next analyzed the reasonableness of the intru-
sions. It pointed out that exceptions are made to the requirement
of a warrant only when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.93 It then reasoned that this exception should only be
applied when the government uses the least restrictive means to
90 35 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.N.H. 1997).
9' See id. at 62.
92 See id at 64 (citing Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174,
179 (1st Cir. 1997).
93 Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
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achieve its purposes. It provided an excellent review of least
restrictive alternative analysis in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that merits extensive quotation:
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that
"[iln every case [state power] must be so exercised as
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe
the protected freedom." [Citations omitted.] "Unduly"
means more than necessary, and the enunciated princi-
ple confines the government to the least intrusive means
adequate to achieve its goals. "'Even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."' The least intrusive means
test has been held to govern some aspects of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 490-500[sic], 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 299
(1983) ("the investigative methods employed [by an of-
ficer conducting a Terry stop] should be the least intru-
sive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time... The scope
of the detention must be carefully tailored to its under-
lying justification.") [citation omitted.]
Even though the extent to which the least intrusive
means requirement is appropriate in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is unsettled, this court believes that a war-
rantless search should not be upheld as constitutional
unless it was the least intrusive means to achieve the
governmental purpose. The well-established test for an
exception to the warrant requirement is "whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search." This test im-
plies a least intrusive means inquiry. The burden of ob-
taining a warrant would not frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search if an alternate, less intrusive
means than the search will nonetheless fully realize the
governmental purpose, stripping away the necessity of a
warrantless search. Thus, the test for a warrant excep-
tion is not met when a less intrusive means than the
614 [Vol. 11:571
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warrantless search will fully realize the governmental
purpose.94
The court then made the obvious observation that a less re-
strictive alternative to posting a police officer in plaintiff's of-
fice was to have a supervisor there, and it therefore concluded
that a warrant was required. It reasoned that the Ortega plural-
ity's exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements
do not hold in cases where the government's actions obviously
are not the least restrictive alternative available to it.95 It there-
fore denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
this issue of the validity of the search of plaintiff's office, and
actually found the search unconstitutional as a matter of law.
96
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claims of unlawful sei-
zure of her property and her person and granted summary judg-
ment for defendants on these issues. The court held there were
sufficient intrusions on both to constitute seizures, but also con-
cluded that the seizures were reasonable given the defendants'
interests in protecting the town's financial records.
97
The Rossi court recognized and discussed the uncertain state
of the law concerning application of the least restrictive alter-
native principle in Fourth Amendment analyses. The court's
limited use of the principle to require a warrant and probable
cause in the situation before it was nevertheless on firm ground.
Its reasoning is, in part, equivalent to that of the Ortega dissent-
ers. Specifically, both reason that the Supreme Court early held
that exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirement
are to be made only when those mandates are not feasible. This,
in turn, is an application of the least restrictive alternative prin-
ciple, the reasoning being that the more restrictive alternatives
to warrants and probable cause are permissible only when the
less intrusive alternatives of warrants and probable cause are
not feasible.98
94 Id. at 66.
9' See id. at 65-68.
96 See id. at 69 (holding that a police officer's warrantless search of em-
ployee's office was unreasonable and violated her Fourth Amendment rights).
97 See id. at 69-72.
98 The least restrictive alternative principle also logically includes a require-
ment that the state use more effective, albeit no less restrictive, alternatives. For a
general discussion of the principle see Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least
Restrictive Alternative as the Only Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in
Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. RaV. 111 (1988).
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Reinforcing the limited use of the least restrictive alterna-
tive principle as ventured in Rossi is a classic article that argues
for use of the principle in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
generally; 99 an article that supports use of "strict scrutiny," in-
cluding the least restrictive alternative principle, whenever war-
rantless searches are being analyzed; 1°° and cases that apply the
least restrictive alternative principle as a factor to include in the
balancing process utilized to determine the reasonableness of
searches and seizures,101 a means to question the government's
stated motives for venturing a search or seizure,10 2 as a require-
ment that clearly feasible and less restrictive alternatives be im-
plemented,10 3 or as a requirement that the government at least
supply some facts that support the unfeasibility of less restric-
tive alternatives.104
Rossi uses the least restrictive alternative principle in the
most limited sense among those suggested by the foregoing
authorities, and it is therefore easier to justify. It does not direct
courts to question the government's motives, to determine
whether its goals are compelling, to assume the burden of pre-
senting facts on the feasibility of alternatives, or to use the least
restrictive alternative. Rather, it simply requires the government
to utilize clearly established, feasible alternatives. Such limited
use of the least restrictive alternative analysis seems especially
appropriate in light of the Ninth Circuit's favorable reference to
less intrusive alternatives upon remand from the Supreme Court
99 See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1173 (1988).
100 See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Res-
urrecting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 531 (1997).
101 See, e.g., Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183 (D.R.I.
1998) (showing that the school employed several alternative methods before using a
bodily search of a student).
102 See, e.g., People v. Velleff, 419 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that an objective and subjective test must be satisfied to find probable for search and
seizure of plastic bag in defendant's car).
103 See, e.g., Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that if plaintiffs were willing to take a breath or urine test, then it was unreasonable
for the police to make them take a blood test).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 1997 WL 564674 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5,
1997) (holding sufficient probable cause existed to authorize the interception of all
wire communications).
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in Ortega. Recall that, on this point, the Ninth Circuit relied
upon language in the Ortega plurality's opinion.
10 5
The Rossi court's analysis can be directly applied to the sci-
entific misconduct context because there are clearly accepted
and feasible less restrictive alternatives to the way searches and
seizures are now conducted there. As explained in Part I of this
article, although Dr. Rich recommends that scientific experts
guide the determination of what is necessary for a conviction
and thereby define the scope of any search and seizure, the ORI
Model Policy calls for immediate search and seizure upon noti-
fication to the accused that an inquiry will occur. The determi-
nation to undertake an inquiry is made by a solitary adminis-
trator, the RIO, and the inquiry panel, which is required to have
sufficient expertise and might guide the RIO's search and sei-
zure, is not required to be appointed until ten days later.
Obvious less restrictive alternatives that would be no more
costly, but would serve to protect professors against massively
intrusive and unnecessary searches and seizures would be to
require that the panel be appointed before any search and sei-
zure, that its expertise be both sufficient and utilized to guide
any search and seizure, and that the accused by offered an op-
portunity to witness and reasonably guide the search and sei-
zure, In the absence of these obvious less restrictive alterna-
tives, warrants and probable cause should be required even if
one rejects the other reasons stated above for keeping those re-
quirements in the scientific misconduct context. 106
Even if the least restrictive alternative principle were not
accepted as supporting the warrant and probable cause require-
ments, failure to use clearly less restrictive and feasible alterna-
tives, such as informed, focused searches and researcher par-
ticipation in the process, should count in the balancing process
used to judge alternatives to warrants and probable cause. It
should tip the scales in favor of finding any unnecessarily intru-
sive search or seizure to be unreasonable. It must be emphasized
that this is not an argument that the least restrictive alternative
principle should be used in all balancing and reasonableness
determinations in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is a lim-
10 5 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
106 As indicated in the text above, the least restrictive alternative principle
could be directly applied to require use of warrants and probable cause whenever less
restrictive alternatives are feasible. It is also developed in the text above that warrants
and probable cause are feasible in the scientific misconduct context.
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ited argument that the principle should at least be utilized if the
warrant and probable cause requirements are found not applica-
ble and a balancing process is used to judge the resulting war-
rantless search or seizure.
Cases relevant on this point are Schowengerdt v. General
Dynamics,10 7 and Varando v. Department of Employment and
Training.10 8 In Schowengerdt, the Ninth Circuit held that sum-
mary judgment was precluded because there was a question of
fact whether the search of a civil service engineer's desk and
credenza for sexual materials was work-related when the gov-
ernment might not have "narrowly tailored" its search to meet
its legitimate interests. The court reasoned that this disputed
question of fact was relevant to both the issue whether a warrant
was required and the issue whether the search was reasonable
even if a warrant was not required. Similarly, in Varando, the
appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that there was no
reasonable cause for a search and seizure because the offending
official did not "consider any other way to obtain the informa-
tion he desired."
It is important to explain that if a balancing process is util-
ized, it should not be supposed that the specific less restrictive
alternatives suggested here (informed, focused searches and re-
search participation) will interfere with the goals of scientific
misconduct regulations. To the contrary, focused, researcher-
assisted searches and seizures actually should enhance the accu-
racy and effectiveness of scientific misconduct proceedings. 109
107 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that civil service employee has a
constitutional right to be free from unnecessary and overbroad searches unrelated to
his work).
l08 687 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming that the search of plain-
tiffs' offices was unreasonable and violative of their Fourth Amendment rights).
109 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the usefulness of scientific
misconduct proceedings in light of alternative corrective mechanisms. On this issue
see Debra M. Parrish, The Federal Government and Scientific Misconduct Proceed-
ings, Past, Present and Future as Seen Through the Thereza Imanishi-Kari Case, 24
J.C. & U.L. 581 (1998) (discussing how the Thereza Imanishi-Kari case was looked
at in both the old and current "regime" of handling scientific misconduct); Lars Noah,
Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for Regulatory Decision-
making, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 677 (1998) (exploring how peer review is being used as
a predicate for medico-legal judgments); Steven Benowitz, Observers Say Fisher
Case Highlights Flaws in System, THE SCIENTST, Mar. 31, 1997, at 1. We will note,
however, that attorney Gunsalus stated, in the educational workshop discussed in part
one of this article, that there was only one conviction for scientific misconduct in the
approximate decade during which she dealt with such cases at her institution. This
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The next question we will address is whether the probable
cause requirement should apply even if the warrant requirement
does not apply. The Ortega plurality considered this as a dis-
tinct possibility, but it ultimately found that neither requirement
should apply in most instances. The reason why the probable
cause requirement could be maintained even without the neces-
sity of a warrant is that the latter might be thought more burden-
some on the government, involving costly court proceedings.
Once again, the exemption from the warrant and probable cause
requirements can only follow, even under the view most -favor-
able to the government, from a balancing process in which the
individual's interest in privacy is swamped by the governmental
interests involved. Even if the requirement of a warrant is
thought too burdensome, that does not mean that a probable
cause requirement would be too onerous, especially in the con-
text of public research universities which have legal staffs who
should possess the requisite expertise in-house. At the same
time, it can be argued that the probable cause requirement is
especially important to protection of individual privacy in the
scientific misconduct process because of the potentially vast
searches the proceedings might lead to and the large number of
private and valuable materials or intellectual property-be-
longing to the researcher or affiliated third parties-that might
be erroneously seized.
The next question becomes: What evidence is necessary to
support a search and seizure of a professor's private matters and
materials under either the probable cause or the reasonable
cause requirement? We tried to make obvious in Part I of this
article that we object to the criteria for proceeding with investi-
gations and searches and seizures listed by attorney Gunsalus.
Her stated intent is to protect both universities and researches
from "crazed whistleblowers" by "imposing process," but she
overlooks the massive intrusions that are invited by simultane-
ous initiations of inquiries and searches and seizures.
She also overlooks that the regulations themselves provide
protection to complainants only if they act in "good faith." 110
Recall that she argues that motives should not be considered
when deciding whether to initiate an inquiry. This is wrong,
experience seems representative, and it obviously raises a question whether the out-
comes of the process are justified by its salient expenses, both pecuniary and other-
wise.
0 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d) (2).
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given the good faith qualification. Of course, conflicts of inter-
est directly bear on motives, and they too are condemned in the
regulations.," Attorney Gunsalus also overlooks that scientific
misconduct proceedings can be misused by either competitors
(colleagues or others) or administrators bent on controlling dis-
sidents. As former National Institutes of Health Director
Bernadine Healy stated when she insisted on adding an appeals
board with an adversarial process to scientific misconduct over-
sight: "[I] came full circle to thinking that an adversarial system
was necessary... It had become obvious that this was a totally
polluted system where these scientists got behind closed doors
and worked out their venom, taking down their colleagues. It
was a star chamber, a travesty of justice."'"2 Given the potential
for abuse, conflicts of interest should be considered when de-
termining whether an allegation merits an inquiry and con-
comitant search and seizure. Good faith requires no less.
The overarching question under the probable cause re-
quirement is whether there is sufficient information possessed
to make it probable or likely that the accused is guilty of scien-
tific misconduct. Under the reasonable cause or suspicion re-
quirement the question is whether there is sufficient information
possessed to raise a reasonable possibility that the accused is
guilty of scientific misconduct. As discussed above, it is not
clear whether the probable cause requirement actually stipulates
a quantum of proof beyond fifty percent probability, but that
seems to be the best reading. It only seems logical to suppose
that reasonable cause or suspicion is a step down from the more
rigorous probable cause requirement. Recall, on the other hand,
that one view is that it is not appropriate to attempt to quantify
"probable cause." By parity of reasoning, it might not be appro-
priate to quantify "reasonable cause." The very uncertainty here
is another reason to adopt the probable cause standard in all sci-
entific misconduct proceedings. "Reasonable cause" is subject
to a reading that requires little more than a scintilla of data and
a very low probability.
Ultimately, the probable cause or reasonable cause require-
ment must take meaning from a developing body of cases. Let
us return, therefore, to the case of Dr. Kay. Her case arguably
|l' Id. § 50.103(d)(9).
112 Gina Kolata, Inquiry Lacking Due Process, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at
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involves either a voluntary relinquishment of her materials to
her employer or a search to which she does not have standing to
object. It could be argued that there was a voluntary relin-
quishment because Biomedical Communications is simply a
part of the University, and it is the University that allegedly
searched for and seized her materials. This is not persuasive,
however, because one does not expect that sharing personal
materials with, say, a co-employee or co-researcher is a volun-
tary relinquishment to the employer. At the same time, the co-
employee or co-researcher might have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in honoring the confidentiality that might have been
understood explicitly or implicitly in the exchange of materials,
albeit at the workplace. If the latter reasoning is accepted, there
is probably a search, but it is directed toward a third party, and
the researcher might not have standing to object to the search of
her colleague that resulted in seizure of her personal materials
from that colleague. 113 Nevertheless, Dr. Kay's case can be most
instructive if it is assumed, hypothetically, that personal materi-
als were seized from her home or private filing cabinets in her
personal office at the University where she alone had keys to
the office and the cabinets.
113 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3 (3d ed. 1996); 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND
SEIZURE §§ 6.1-6.19 (3d ed. 2000). Two additional points will be mentioned. First, if
Biomedical Communications is conceived to be a separate entity that can object to
demand for Dr. Kay's materials, the demand itself might be conceived to be akin to a
subpoena or request for production of documents as to which it could have and
should have objected. If so, the issues could become ones of Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and due process of law. See HALL, supra note 33, §§
39.1-39.20. Second, it is conceivable, although not likely, that even if Biomedical
Communications were conceived to be a separate entity, a person in Dr. Kay's cir-
cumstances could overcome a standing objection by claiming that Biomedical Com-
munications and entities like it are analogous to lawyers to whom one's confidential
information is turned over for necessary advice and assistance in the context of a
sacred and privileged relationship. Regarding the special protections attendant to
searches of attorneys' offices pertaining to materials of their clients, see LAFAVE,
supra note 47, §4.1(h); Hall, supra note 33, §39.11. The protections afforded to mate-
rials in the possession of one's attorney are not complete and the analogy to that
context is obviously not perfect. The argument might be buttressed, however, by
pointing out the importance of the scientific enterprise, its centrality to academic
freedom, and its relationship to the First Amendment. Regarding the latter, see, for
example, Roy G. Spece, Jr. & Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of
Experimentation: A Critical Review and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the
Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 185 (1998).
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As explained above, the scientific misconduct charges made
against Dr. Kay were either scientifically absurd or without any
substantiation whatsoever. Moreover, it was ridiculously simple
to unearth the lack of substantiation. It merely required discus-
sions and requests to the accuser and the accused as well as re-
view of a published review article. This case, then, did not pres-
ent one of either probable or reasonable cause to proceed with
an inquiry or a search and seizure based on scientific miscon-
duct. It is also true that one should consider the conflicts of in-
terest of both Ms. Cover and Dr. Cusanovich in assessing this
situation. First, Ms. Cover had resigned from Dr. Kay's labora-
tory over a question of hours and compensation. This created a
potential conflict of interest in the form of expected animosity.
Second, Ms. Cover had filed a claim for injuries allegedly in-
curred in the freezer unplugging incident. If she could convince
people that Dr. Kay unplugged the freezer as part of a plot to
embezzle money, her claim would be strengthened immensely.
This is an obvious financial conflict of interest.
Likewise, Dr. Cusanovich and Dr. Kay had a long-standing
feud well before any allegations were made against Dr. Kay. He
should have recused himself from the process. On the other
hand, it should be pointed out that physicians and scientists are
not well schooled in conflicts of interest, and many or most of
them need to become better educated and more sensitive on the
topic. 4 In the same vein, vice presidents for research are
placed in a very contentious role. They administer large sums of
money, space, and other resources, and they must make deci-
sions that are inevitably bound to upset some researchers. We
say this as a preface to a recommendation that the RIO and en-
tire scientific misconduct process and administration be re-
moved from the Office of the Vice President for Research to
avoid ineluctable conflicts of interest.
The next question becomes what the proper scope of a
search and seizure is, because, as the Ortega plurality correctly
points out, a search must be judged in its inception and its
scope. Once again, this depends on whether the probable cause
or reasonable cause is required. Above, the question was
whether there was probable cause or reasonable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty of scientific misconduct. Here, on the
"4 See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH at ix
(Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al. eds., 1996).
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other hand, the question is whether there is probable or reason-
able cause to believe that data relevant to such misconduct will
be found in a certain place that is proposed to be searched. Gen-
erally, there is neither probable cause nor reasonable cause to
believe that a professor's private matters or materials will house
data that could not be obtained simply by asking the professor
to produce copies of all data and information relevant to an al-
legation of scientific misconduct.
On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that
search of a professor's private office, desk, filing cabinets,
similar spaces, and materials therein will consist primarily, if
not solely, of personal items and information. These might in-
clude recorded thoughts and materials relevant to teaching, per-
sonal, or consulting projects as opposed to matters related to
federally or locally funded grants, and other miscellaneous
items having no relationship to a specific charge of scientific
misconduct. Materials relevant to federally or locally funded
projects should be contained in laboratory notebooks and other
spaces or containers in the laboratory itself. This space is not
likely to be considered private by either the researcher, the in-
stitution, or the courts.
This is to say that items that are likely to be at least partially
university or federally funded are likely to be found outside the
professor's office or other private spaces in the workplace.
Items outside these protected zones are subject to directed
sharing with the institution without any probable cause or rea-
sonable cause requirement. This does not mean that there are no
reasonable expectations of privacy and resulting Fourth
Amendment limitations in a laboratory. For example, there are
restrictions on the university placing a hidden camera to sp
upon the professor and his assistants while in the laboratory.
Moreover, as indicated in Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 116 discussed
above, the employee (in the present context a professor) can
have a possessory interest protected by the Fourth Amendment
in property that belongs to the employer. Recall the point that
loose talk about university "ownership" of huge realms of prop-
erty is unacceptable here; ownership is not a monolithic all-or-
nothing concept-it must be calibrated to the circumstances.
115 Cf. State v. Coleman, 856 P.2d 121 (Kan. 1993) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in post office breakroom intruded upon by warrantless video
surveillance as part of criminal investigation).
1 6 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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In Rossi, the interest was in town financial records the
plaintiff needed access to in order to comply with a state law
requiring an audit. In the case of a professor, access to research
data and materials is needed to continue fulfilling the require-
ments of the granting agency as well to exercise one's profes-
sion and academic freedom. This is where Dr. Price's advice to
quickly copy all records, discussed in Part I of this article, does
have some validity. We raised a criticism above that he seemed
to call for too great a sweep in any search and seizure. How-
ever, once a search and seizure is carefully tailored, it is crucial
to quickly copy all materials so as to minimize the intrusion on
the professor's ongoing research. (To the extent materials can-
not be duplicated, other reasonable arrangements for preserva-
tion and concomitant access must be made.) If not, there will be
an unreasonable seizure.
Dr. Kay has stated to us that certain of her personal items
were seized from Biomedical Communications, and that they
were not promptly returned to her. Indeed, if she had been able
to proceed with her career, certain of these materials would
have been necessary to some of her intellectual activities within
and without the University. Ironically, however, this became
moot because her research was trashed by more drastic action
than any sweeping search and seizure. Her laboratory was shut
down based upon apparently erroneous or trivial safety allega-
tions. Although she was subsequently ostensibly returned to her
faculty status following two decisions of the Pima County Supe-
rior Court, she was barred from both her laboratory and the
University generally. Thus, although she has not been found
guilty of anything, she has been deprived of her profession for
what is now over two years.
Once again, clearer meaning as to the scope of permissible
searches and seizures will have to await development of a body
of cases involving concrete factual situations. Let us turn for
some guidance, once again, to the case of Dr. Kay. Under the
ORI procedures as described above, all notebooks, if any, re-
lating to specific charges of scientific misconduct against Dr.
Kay should have been copied and sequestered no later than
March 13, 1997, when Dr. Kay was notified that the UCEC was
conducting an inquiry involving allegations against her. As ex-
plained above, however, no such steps were taken. Indeed, Dr.
Kay had been attempting to obtain laboratory materials she al-
leged were taken by Ms. Cover when she resigned employment
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with Dr. Kay. Ms. Cover seems to have conceded as much if
one believes what the police say she told them when she re-
ported her car stolen on March 12, 1997.
This all might seem moot because the only search and sei-
zure we have described applied to the requests for slides, grant
proposals, and other materials from Biomedical Communica-
tions. The matter is not that simple. First, recall what the re-
quest to Biomedical Communications sought: anything else re-
lating to Dr. Kay or a named former graduate student. This is
just the sort of "cleaning out the laboratory" that Dr. Rich
warned against. Even Dr. Price would likely balk at such a wide
sweep.
On the other hand, new evidence and material might have
emerged between the March 13, 1997 initiation of an inquiry
and the much later investigation launched by Dr. Cetas and the
Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Perhaps there
was a general charge of failure to meet standards expected of a
professor. The reasoning might be that such a general charge
and initial indications of it possibly being true might justify sei-
zure of "anything and everything." Recall also that the NSF
definition of scientific misconduct speaks of "other serious de-
viation from accepted practices," while the PHS definition re-
fers to "other practices that seriously deviate from those that are
commonly accepted within the scientific community." If an
NSF grant were at issue, the institution could attempt to justify
a sweeping search and seizure by arguing that it was dictated by
an expert determination that the researcher's conduct consti-
tuted a significant deviation from "accepted practices."
Even an institution limited to the PHS definition (such as
the University of Arizona in this instance) could attempt to jus-
tify "cleaning out" the researcher's laboratory by asserting that
there were indications of a general failure to adhere to com-
monly accepted practices. Even in this scenario, however, it is
still unreasonable to request anything and everything. One is
still limited to anything and everything pertinent to federally
and locally funded research. In other words, even under the
most capacious interpretation of what is permissible, the request
for anything and everything related to Dr. Kay was improper.
What is ironic is that although UCEC notified Dr. Kay that
charges of scientific misconduct against her had not been sub-
stantiated, it was later suggested that this was possibly the result
of Dr. Kay trying to hide wrongdoing. As explained above, this
:20011
HEALTH MATRIX
is one possible explanation for the fact that scientific miscon-
duct proceedings were carried out by two different panels of the
Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Dr. Kay was told
by an attorney hired by the university to represent CAFT that
she could not be dismissed as a result of these proceedings, and
she was limited to fifteen hours to present her case in chief and
to cross examine prosecution witnesses in what turned out to be
a dismissal hearing. She was also denied representation of an
attorney, a requirement of Arizona law. She was "convicted"
and subsequently dismissed by the university president after she
refused his offer of a guilty plea and one year without pay and
with psychological counseling. (There was never any evidence
or indication of a psychological diagnosis.)
Subsequently, the Arizona courts found the university's ac-
tions to have been arbitrary and capricious, and this negated the
CAFT proceedings and Dr. Kay's dismissal. Therefore, the uni-
versity president simultaneously reinstated her and then fired
her subject to appeal and "retrial" before a new CAFT panel.
The bases of the new dismissal, set forth in a letter from the
university provost to Dr. Kay, were the findings from the now
defunct CAFT proceedings and a general allegation of failure to
abide by standards expected of a professor in her position. 17 As
the page proofs of this article were being read, articles in local
newspapers reported that the University had already spent close
to $ 1 million in attorneys' fees in the Kay proceedings.' 18 This
was in addition to services provided by the University's in-
house law firm of ten lawyers, five "legal assistants," and one
"investigator." The yearly salaries of those personnel total
$987,520. The saga continues.
117 Regarding the facts in this paragraph, see supra note 5.
118 See Eric Wesflander, UA Spends $JM to Oust Prof, TUCSON CrTZEN, Mar.
29,2001, at IA; The Skinny, TUCSON WKLY., June 7-13, 2001.
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